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Divisiveness, National Narratives, and the 
Establishment Clause 
 
Gilad Abiri* 
 
Abstract 
 
The Supreme Court habitually justifies the Establishment 
Clause as a means to prevent political division, protect the civil 
peace, and forestall citizen alienation.  In spite of this popularity 
among the judiciary, legal scholars have emphatically rejected 
the political division theory.  They state that religion is not 
especially divisive, and that even if it was, there is no reason to 
think non-establishment will prevent such political harm.  This 
rejection relies on the misconception that the validity of the 
political division theory requires that all forms of religion must 
foment civil strife.  This is a mistake.  Often, laws apply to a wider 
category than to the core of what they seek to address.  If this is 
the case, then even if non-establishment comes to merely prevent 
an especially erosive type of state and religion involvement, it 
may still be a valid and useful theory. 
In this Article, I argue that the political division theory is 
compelling when it is applied to a religion which seeks to collapse 
the distinction between politics and religion.  To achieve this, I 
portray one such form of establishment of religion: American 
Christian Nationality, an ideology which sees the United States 
as having deep religious meaning and promotes Christianity as 
the central attribute of American identity.  This Article will show 
that the combination between nationality and religion is 
uniquely divisive because it promotes a religious-based 
exclusionary understanding of who is a “real” American citizen.  
Many of the canonical Establishment Clause doctrines seem 
 
* Post-Doctoral Global Fellow, NYU Law School.  I am deeply grateful to Paul 
Kahn and Anthony Kronman for countless conversations, insightful feedback, 
and guidance. This Article benefited greatly from comments and suggestions 
made by Samuel Moyn, David Grewal, Shai Wozner, Jaclyn Neo, Brett 
Scharffs, Gordon Silverstein, Ofra Bloch, Daniel Maggen, Roman Zinigrad, 
Sebastian Guidi, Fernando Braccacinni, Natalia Pires, Shlomit Jessel and by 
participants in workshops at Yale Law School, the National University of 
Singapore, and Bar-Ilan University. 
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tailored to protect against government involvement in such 
religious movements. 
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I. Introduction 
 
During the Value Voters Summit held in Washington, D.C., 
in September 2016, Donald Trump, then a contender in the 
Republican presidential primaries, made a statement that was 
met with a standing ovation.  He started by declaring that under 
his administration, “our Christian heritage will be cherished, 
protected, defended like you’ve never seen before.”1  He went 
further to declare his disdain for the Johnson Amendment, 
which prohibits tax exempt religious institutions from 
supporting or opposing political candidates, stating that it 
“blocked our pastors and ministers and others from speaking 
their minds from their own pulpits.  If they want to talk about 
Christianity, if they want to preach, if they want to talk about 
politics, they are unable to do so.”2  In a more recent tweet, 
 
1.  Eugene Scott, Trump Says He’s Fulfilled His Promises to Christians, 
but He Really Means White Evangelicals, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2017, 10:00 
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/15/trump-
says-hes-fulfilled-his-promises-to-christians-but-he-really-means-white-
evangelicals/. 
2.  Ellen Aprill, Trump Wants to Force You—the Taxpayer—to Pay for 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/8
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President Trump applauded the fact that “[n]umerous states 
introducing Bible Literacy classes, giving students the option of 
studying the Bible.  Starting to make a turn back? Great!”3  
These controversial statements—unparalleled in modern 
presidential history—show that we are at a watershed moment 
with regard to the separation of church and state.  This demands 
that, as a society, we re-engage with, and perhaps recommit to, 
the fundamental justifications for keeping religion out of 
politics, and politics out of religion. 
Nearly fifty years ago, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice 
Warren Burger declared that the purpose of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment is to protect against the harmful 
political effects of state involvement in religion.4  In his words, 
“political division along religious lines was one of the principal 
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to 
protect.  The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to 
the normal political process.”5  He is not alone; in fact, the 
political division theory for non-establishment is by far the most 
often cited justification for the separation of church and state in 
Supreme Court cases.6  In stark contrast to its popularity among 
the justices, an overwhelming majority of legal scholars have 
emphatically rejected the political division theory as judicial 
folly.7  Religion, they argue, is not an especially divisive force in 
American Society, and even if it was, there is no reason to think 
that non-establishment will resolve this divisiveness. 
In this Article, I argue that the political division theory, if 
understood correctly, is actually a fitting justification for the 
Establishment Clause.  Specifically, I argue that in opposing the 
political division theory, most scholars assume this theory 
entails that all forms of religion must foment civil strife and 
endanger peaceful politics.  This is a mistake; even if non-
establishment is used to merely prevent one especially erosive 
type of establishment, it may still make sense to separate church 
 
Campaigning from the Pulpit, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2017, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/03/trump-
wants-to-force-taxpayers-to-pay-for-campaigning-from-the-pulpit/. 
3.  Donald J. Trump (@RealDonaldTrump), Tᴡɪᴛᴛᴇʀ (Jan. 28, 2019, 8:21 
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1089876055224184833. 
4.  403 U.S.602, 622 (1971). 
5.  Id. 
6.  See infra Part II. 
7.  See discussion infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1. 
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and state generally.  This result has crucial implications for the 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause and its specific 
doctrines. 
To achieve this, I portray one such form of establishment of 
religion: American Christian Nationality,8 an ideology which 
sees the United States as having a deep religious meaning and 
promotes Christianity as the central attribute of American 
identity.  I will show that this combination between nationality 
and religion is both uniquely divisive and can be largely 
addressed by adherence to non-establishment doctrine.  I argue, 
first, that the equation of American identity with Christianity 
(or any religion for that matter) will necessarily alienate and 
exclude many American citizens.  Such an exclusion could create 
grave political harm.  Subsequently, I argue that this harmful 
effect can be (and in fact, is) abated by a strict interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause.  Strong methods of separation of 
church and state put significant hurdles in the way of the 
political project of Christian nationality.  This danger is not 
hypothetical, as tales of woe, like the ascent to dominance of 
Hindu nationalism in India, suggest that Jefferson’s wall of 
separation may need bolstering. 
This Article offers three central contributions: first and 
foremost, it intervenes in the debate on the meaning and 
justification of the Establishment Clause and seeks to put 
theoretical weight in support of the intuitive strength and 
judicial popularity of the political division theory; second, it 
argues that the political division theory should influence 
Establishment Clause doctrine, potentially distinguishing 
between public facing and reclusive types of governmental 
involvement in religion; third, this Article offers an innovative 
conceptualization of the challenge that religious nationality 
 
8.  The choice of the term “nationality” is intentional.  In choosing it, I 
follow the contemporary lead of the important political theorist David Miller 
in his book On Nationality, and, classically, of John Stuart Mill in his 
Considerations on Representative Government.  See JOHN STUART MILL, 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (Prometheus Books, 2006) 
(1861); DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (David Miller & Allen Ryan eds., 1995).  
The issue of using the more common term “nationalism” is that it is often 
interpreted as including moral condemnation, and is thought to include 
positions that are unpalatable from a liberal perspective.  This does not fit the 
thrust of this Article, which does not seek to morally condemn either American 
Civic Nationality or Christian nationality.  For this reason, I chose to try and 
avoid such interpretative baggage by using another term. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/8
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poses for liberal constitutionalism generally, and specifically for 
American First Amendment doctrine.  By doing so, it offers a 
novel analysis of Christian nationality in the context of 
constitutional law. 
First, the Article first lays out the two main variations of the 
political division theory: the civil peace variation and the 
alienation rationales variation for non-establishment and 
explores the common objections they face.  In both of these 
theories, the purpose of non-establishment is the prevention of 
the harmful political effects of religion.  These rationales are 
commonly based on the argument that religion as an ideology is, 
by its nature, especially divisive and entrenched.  Therefore, 
conflicts surrounding it are particularly pernicious.  
Consequently, under these rationales, at least one of the 
purposes of the separation of church and state is to eliminate the 
ability of religious groups to compete for state power.  These 
rationales lead constitutional courts toward either judicial 
neutrality or to a strict interpretation of non-establishment.  
Legal scholars summarily dismiss these rationales, noting that 
religion as a topic is not especially divisive in the United States, 
and asserting that race and inequality appear to provide far 
more significant sources of social strife.  Religious groups are 
also not necessarily more intolerant than other ideological 
groups, as attested to by the many progressive religious 
denominations.  This is commonly believed to mean that the civil 
peace and alienation rationales fail to explain the 
distinctiveness of religion in the Establishment Clause. 
Second, the Article starts addressing these objections by 
developing an account of the ideology of Christian nationality.  
Focusing on the American case, both contemporary and 
historical, I define an ideology of religious (in our case Christian) 
nationality as one in which the ultimate provider of legitimacy 
for state power is not the people, but the Divine.  With their 
insistence on Divine rather than civil authority, ideologies of 
religious nationality inevitably seek a unification of politics and 
religion.  Supporters of Christian nationality view Christianity 
as the defining mark of the nation; they also view the authority 
of the state as derived from a divine source, and not from the will 
of the popular sovereign; finally, they see the nation-state as an 
important part in the divine program. 
Third, the Article argues that Christian nationality in the 
5
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United States has the unique status of an intimate rival.  It is 
intimate of mainstream politics since Christians are able to—
due to significant overlap with American civil religion—
successfully present themselves as the carriers of the authentic 
character of the nation-state and utilize modern political tools.  
And it is rival because Christians promote a vision of society and 
politics which fundamentally challenges the political identity of 
the state generally, and American civil nationality specifically.  
This means that unlike outright rivals, such as communist 
parties or competing national groups, Christian nationality is 
able to co-exist with American civil nationality while vying for 
political and cultural power. 
Fourth, based on my account of the intimate rivalry of 
Christian nationality, this Article argues that although the civil 
peace and alienation rationales fail when applied to religion 
generally, they are far more persuasive when applied to 
Christian nationality.  There are two reasons to believe 
Christian nationality is an especially divisive ideology.  First, 
unlike most other religious ideologies, Christian nationality is 
theologically invested in the behavior of the state and its 
citizens.  As part of this, Christian nationality promotes an 
exclusionary idea of who is a fully fledged American, which is 
very likely to create alienation and resentment if promoted by 
the state.  Equating being an American with being a Christian 
is quite literally dividing the citizen body along religious lines.  
Second, adherents to Christian nationality exhibit higher 
intolerance levels than almost any other group.  These are 
fundamentalist and revivalist religious movements, which see 
themselves as the only source of morality and knowledge in 
society.  These mechanisms of intolerance, together with the fact 
that, as an intimate rival, Christian nationality is uniquely 
situated to influence and even dramatically transform the state, 
make the case that the fear of the divisive political effect of 
Christian nationality is well warranted. 
The Article then turns to argue that this state of affairs 
supports a policy of non-establishment.  This is because of two 
reasons: first, the main alternative to non-establishment, 
namely free exercise, seems ineffectual in the face of an ideology 
which is concerned with getting the state itself to behave in a 
way more consistent with their religious beliefs; second, non-
establishment seems tailored to battle the risk of intimate 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/8
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rivalry.  If the fear is that Christian nationality is more capable 
of influencing the state than other religious ideologies, then that 
is a reason to build the wall of separation of church and state 
both high and tall.  Subsequently, I argue that although the 
political division theory is convincing only in the case of an 
ideology that combines religion and nationality, it is still 
reasonable to apply the Establishment Clause to religion as a 
general category.  This is because it is both impossible and 
undesirable for courts to make a distinction between dangerous 
and benign forms of religion. 
Lastly, the Article explores some possible policy 
implications of the proposed interpretation of the political 
division theory.  First, I argue that although the impossibility of 
accurately identifying religious nationality in the United States 
makes it reasonable to prohibit the establishment of any 
religion, non-establishment may still be applied in different 
intensities: tailoring the treatment to the different concerns 
raised by the vector of the proposed establishment.  I will 
suggest that it makes sense to distinguish expansive 
establishment from generic establishment.  Expansive 
establishment seeks to transform the political sphere, which 
must be suspect under the political division theory, while 
establishment seeks to defend religious communities and enable 
them to survive, and perhaps even thrive. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II presents and 
analyzes the civil peace and alienation rationales for non-
establishment.  Part III provides background definitions, 
distinguishes between religious and civic nationality, and 
concisely outlines both American civil religion and American 
Christian nationality.  This part concludes by developing the 
argument that American Christian nationality has a status of 
intimate rivalry.  Part IV suggests that the civil peace and 
alienation rationales are far more plausible when applied to 
Christian nationality.  Part V offers preliminary thoughts on 
how to advance Establishment Clause theory in accordance with 
the political division theory. 
 
II. The Rejection of the Political Division Theory 
 
The vast majority of liberal constitutional regimes, 
including that of the United States, consider religion as a 
7
2019 THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 403 
distinct phenomenon warranting special treatment.  In the 
United States, the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”) states that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability” unless this burden promotes 
a “compelling governmental interest” in the least restrictive way 
possible.9  Successful claims were brought under this statute, 
and similar ones passed by states, under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment for religious exemptions in the 
fields of compulsory education,10 rules regulating animal 
slaughter,11 health insurance regulation,12 civil rights statutes, 
and more.  At the same time, the most dramatic example of 
treating religions distinctly is the separation of church and 
state.  Under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 
religious organizations are, in principle, excluded from receiving 
any government support.  The pervasiveness of doctrines and 
statutes that expressly single out religious beliefs13 suggests 
that these beliefs possess special attributes and functions that 
distinguish them from non-religious beliefs.  Indeed, the 
anomalous and special status of religion is a central topic in 
constitutional theory and in case law. 
The goal in this Part, and in the Article generally, is to lay 
out one attempt to solve the conundrum of the special status of 
religion under the Establishment Clause.  In so doing, this Part 
will examine the political division theory, which holds that the 
reason for separating church and state is that religion based 
political conflict is especially divisive.  This Part will examine 
 
9.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000bb-1 (2019). 
10.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the free 
exercise clause outweighs the government interest in education). 
11.  Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1902 (2018) (defining 
“slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith” 
and similar procedures prescribed by other faiths as “humane” 
notwithstanding the general rule that humane slaughter of livestock requires 
that the animals be stunned before “being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or 
cut”). 
12.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) 
(claiming an exemption, under the RFRA, from the contraceptive coverage 
mandate issued under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
13.  See ANTHONY BRADNEY, LAW AND FAITH IN A SCEPTICAL AGE 34 (2009) 
(“Special provisions with respect to religion can be justified on the grounds that 
they help the State to accommodate the complex variety of views of the good 
that exist within its borders”); REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 
THE LIBERAL STATE 110–11 (2d ed. 2013). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/8
404 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 40.1 
the two main variations of the political division theory—the 
“Civil Peace” and “Alienation” rationales—as well as the main 
criticisms directed at them. 
It is impossible to precisely define the threshold of validity 
and persuasiveness a constitutional justification must pass in 
order to be considered valid.  Still, constitutional rationales for 
non-establishment need to provide good answers to two central 
questions.  The first is what makes religion distinctive in a way 
that warrants special state treatment.  That is, the rationale 
must explain why religion “deserves a level of legal protection 
that most other human interests and activities do not receive.”14  
For example, if I suggest that the distinctiveness of religion is 
that it has psychologically pleasing rituals, it can be pointed out 
that national culture or football leagues have many similar 
rituals.  It is not necessary to find an attribute that is unique to 
religion; it is sufficient to identify a function or value that is 
served by religion in a more effective or essential manner.  The 
second question arises if the answer to this first question is 
plausible.  In this case, the rationale must account for why this 
distinctiveness calls for a specific type of non-establishment 
regime.  In the literature, these questions are encapsulated in 
the two criteria of distinctiveness and cogency.15 
In order for any justification to be clear, the nature of the 
justification must be identified.  Non-establishment is an 
umbrella term for several distinct legal and political ideas.  
Gideon Sapir identifies four distinct positions associated with 
non-establishment: (1) strict interpretation; (2) neutrality 
interpretation; (3) non-coercion interpretation; and (4) non-
 
14.  Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in 
Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 198 (1991). 
15.  Id. at 198–99. 
 
The distinctiveness requirement demands that a rationale 
identify something distinctive about religion that explains 
why religion deserves a level of legal protection that most 
other human interests and activities do not receive. . . . 
Finally, a rationale must meet the cogency requirement.  It 
must credibly explain not only how religion is distinctive, 
but how it is distinctive in a way that calls for a 
constitutional principle forbidding governmental regulation 
or interference in matters of religion.  Id. 
 
9
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institutionalization interpretation.16 
Under strict interpretation, non-establishment requires 
establishing a “secular public moral order.”17  This position 
requires a hermetically sealed separation between religion and 
state, with no government involvement in supporting or 
endorsing any type of religious symbols or institutions.  The 
strict interpretation even forbids the government from an 
“acknowledgment of religion.”18 
The neutrality interpretation requires the state “to 
minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages 
religious belief or disbelief, practice or non-practice, observance 
or nonobservance.”19  It follows that “religion is to be left as 
wholly to private choice as anything can be.”20 
Under the non-coercion interpretation, the “state may single 
out religion in general or any religious denomination as more 
valuable than other options.  A state should not, however, take 
action, or enact policy or law, that has the intention or effect of 
coercing people to accept any specific religion or religion in 
general.”21 
The non-institutionalization interpretation does not 
prohibit any government support, endorsement, or even 
coercion.  Instead, it prohibits religion from becoming part of the 
government.  The state may not integrate religious institutions 
into its administration or legal system.22 
These four ideas will be utilized when examining the 
rationales of non-establishment. 
 
A. The Civil Peace Rationale 
 
The civil peace justification for the special treatment of 
religion contains two basic assertions.  The first is that religion 
presents a serious and powerful source of social tension and 
conflict.  The second is that dealing with this tension requires 
 
16.  See Gidon Sapir, Religion and State—A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 587–93 (1999). 
17.  Id. at 588. 
18.  Id. at 592. 
19.  Id. at 588. 
20.  Id. at 588–89. 
21.  Id. at 590–91. 
22.  See Gidon, supra note 16, at 592. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/8
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the non-establishment of religion. 
This rationale is the most frequently articulated 
justification for religious freedom and non-establishment in 
American courts.  For example, in a statement in Walz v. Tax 
Commission of New York City,23 in which the Supreme Court 
established that tax exemptions for religious buildings do not 
violate the Establishment Clause, Justice Harlan wrote that, 
“[w]hat is at stake” in the First Amendment’s religion clauses “is 
preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in 
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife 
and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.”24  
This danger is not completely averted by acting according to a 
principle of government neutrality which allows government 
involvement which treats all religions equally.  According to 
Justice Harlan, “[a]lthough the very fact of neutrality may limit 
the intensity of involvement, government participation in 
certain programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the state 
in details of administration and planning, may escalate to the 
point of inviting undue fragmentation.”25  Justice Harlan also 
joined Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion in Schempp v. 
Abington School District,26 wherein Goldberg stated that 
instituting bible readings in public schools crosses into “the 
realm of the sectarian as to give rise to those very divisive 
influences and inhibitions of freedom which both religion clauses 
of the First Amendment preclude.”27  Similar language is used 
by Justice Black in a passionate dissent in Board of Education 
of Central School District No.1 v. Allen,28 in which the Supreme 
Court allowed school boards to let students from parochial 
schools borrow books at no cost, where he argues that 
 
To authorize a State to tax its residents for such 
church purposes is to put the State squarely in the 
religious activities of certain religious groups that 
happen to be strong enough politically to write 
their own religious preferences and prejudices 
 
23.  397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
24.  Id. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
25.  Id. at 695. 
26.  374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
27.  Id. at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
28.  392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
11
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into the laws.  This links state and churches 
together in controlling the lives and destinies of 
our citizenship—a citizenship composed of people 
of myriad religious faiths, some of them bitterly 
hostile to and completely intolerant of the 
others.29 
 
In Black’s opinion, the profusion of faiths among the citizen 
body and the potential antagonism among faiths makes any 
movement towards establishment fraught with peril.  Here, he 
finds the grounding rationale of the Establishment Clause: 
 
The First Amendment’s prohibition against 
governmental establishment of religion was 
written on the assumption that state aid to 
religion and religious schools generates discord, 
disharmony, hatred, and strife among our people, 
and that any government that supplies such aids 
is to that extent a tyranny.  And I still believe that 
the only way to protect minority religious groups 
from majority groups in this country is to keep the 
wall of separation between church and state high 
and impregnable as the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments provide.  The Court’s affirmance 
here bodes nothing but evil to religious peace in 
this country.30 
 
Writing in the majority opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman,31 in 
which the Court found that state funding for secular education 
which takes place in religious schools violates the First 
Amendment, Chief Justice Burger developed the civil peace 
justification further.  In the case, Burger offers the three-
pronged Lemon test for deciding whether a government act 
violates the Establishment Clause: (1) does the statute have a 
secular purpose?; (2) does the statute serve to primarily advance 
or inhibit religion?; and (3) will the statute result in an 
 
29.  Id. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting). 
30.  Id. at 254. 
31.  403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/8
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“excessive government entanglement” with religion?32  The civil 
peace rationale is integrated into the entanglement prong of the 
Lemon test.  Whenever a state action towards a religion has 
“divisive political potential,”33 it constitutes excessive 
entanglement and is thus unconstitutional.  Chief Justice 
Burger further argues that state funding of religious schools 
poses a significant risk of divisiveness.  According to him, this 
type of educational program will inevitably promote political 
involvement in response to religious pressures: 
 
Partisans of parochial schools, understandably 
concerned with rising costs and sincerely 
dedicated to both the religious and secular 
educational missions of their schools, will 
inevitably champion this cause and promote 
political action to achieve their goals.  Those who 
oppose state aid, whether for constitutional, 
religious, or fiscal reasons, will inevitably respond 
and employ all of the usual political campaign 
techniques to prevail.  Candidates will be forced 
to declare, and voters to choose.34 
 
Here the unique nature of religious beliefs become pertinent: 
 
Ordinarily political debate and division, however 
vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy 
manifestations of our democratic system of 
government, but political division along religious 
lines was one of the principal evils against which 
the First Amendment was intended to protect.  
The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a 
threat to the normal political process.35 
 
The idea of divisiveness remained a key concern of the Court’s 
establishment jurisprudence for at least a decade following 
 
32.  See id. 
33.  Id. at 622. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. 
13
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Lemon.36 
More recently, the civil peace rationale provided the basis 
for Justice Breyer’s dissent in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.37  The 
majority opinion held that a school voucher program in Ohio did 
not violate the Establishment Clause.  Although Breyer joined 
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Souter, Breyer wrote 
separately in order “to emphasize the risk that public voucher 
programs pose in terms of religiously based social conflict.”38  He 
did so because he believed “that the Establishment Clause 
concern for protecting the Nation’s social fabric from religious 
conflict poses an overriding obstacle to the implementation of 
this well-intentioned school voucher program.”39  Explaining the 
centrality of the civil peace rationale to the 20th century Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, he starts by suggesting 
that “[t]he Court appreciated the religious diversity of 
contemporary American Society.”40  He also expresses his 
understanding that the “status quo favored some religions at the 
expense of others,” and understanding the “Establishment 
Clause to prohibit (among other things) any such favoritism.”41  
The reason this prohibition entails strong separation, and not a 
regime of equal treatment, is due the historical lessons that 
“show that efforts to obtain equivalent funding for the private 
education of children whose parents did not hold popular 
religious beliefs only exacerbated religious strife . . . .”42  A 
governmental school voucher program, under conditions of 
intense religious diversity, would necessarily cause political 
conflict among different religious groups which would naturally 
have divergent concerns over the implementation of such a 
program.  If so, “how is the State to resolve the resulting 
controversies without provoking legitimate fears of the kinds of 
religious favoritism that, in so religiously diverse a Nation, 
threaten social dissension?”  Since it is likely that a government 
cannot successfully meet such a challenge, “the Court has 
 
36.  See Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 
94 GEO. L. J. 1667, 1692 (2005). 
37.  536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
38.  Id. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. at 721. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 722. 
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recognized that we must rely on the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment to protect against religious strife.”  As the scholar 
Michael Garnett has explained, for Breyer, the 
 
[I]dentification, prevention, and elimination of 
“religious strife” are integral parts of the Court’s 
interpretive, expositive, and enforcement tasks.  
That is, the construction of a “social fabric” free of 
“religiously based social conflict” is more than a 
desirable result of obeying and enforcing our 
Constitution’s no-establishment command—it is 
the command itself.43 
 
The scholarly arguments mustered in support of the civil 
peace rationale can be divided into two types.  The first type of 
argument deals with the nature of religious belief systems.  
These beliefs “involve the deepest questions of self and spirit” 
and rely on a “suppression of doubt.”44  That is, they “reject 
reason’s authority in principle,” which makes them “less subject 
to persuasion.”45  Because religious beliefs are often based on 
sources that are unquestionably authoritative for adherents, 
such as revelation, the moral force of these sources is so great 
that they resist compromise, regardless of the consequences.  
The combination of the rejection of reason and the inability to 
compromise “threatens to disrupt political processes when it is 
not only uncompromising but undiscussable and, from a secular 
standpoint, radically arbitrary.”46  It follows that religious 
conflicts are harder to resolve because the sides have a harder 
time discussing, negotiating, and reaching a modus vivendi. 
The second type of argument deals with the nature of a 
religious community as an all-encompassing cultural group.  
Such a cultural group 
 
[C]overs various important aspects of life: it 
defines people’s activities . . . determines 
 
43.  Garnett, supra note 36, at 1674. 
44.  Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory 
of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 360 (1996). 
45.  Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison’s Wager: Religious Liberty in the 
Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 347, 372 (1995). 
46.  Id. at 373. 
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occupations . . . and defines important 
relationships . . . .  It affects everything people do: 
cooking, architectural style, common language, 
literary and artistic traditions, music, customs, 
dress, festivals, and ceremonies. . . .  The culture 
influences its members’ taste, the types of options 
they have and the meaning of these options, and 
the characteristics they consider significant in 
their evaluation of themselves and others.47 
 
The nature of religious belief operates as the unifying logic of the 
religious community as an encompassing cultural group.  It 
creates a common language and provides common assumptions 
that both unite the religious community and isolate it from the 
rest of the polity.  This means that the divisive potential of 
religion is relatively high. 
How do these two types of arguments support the separation 
of religion from state?  In applying the civil peace rationale to 
the context of non-establishment, Kent Greenwalt argues that 
“[i]nevitably, some tensions will exist between adherents of 
different religions who believe each other to be fundamentally 
misguided about ultimate truth.  But the tensions are bound to 
increase if those adherents see themselves in a struggle for state 
support—financial and other—and for the levers of political 
power.”48  Thus, the elimination through neutrality or a strict 
version of non-establishment limiting the ability of religious 
groups to compete over state power is the goal of the separation 
of church and state.  This logic is complemented by the idea that 
granting a wide array of religious freedoms and exemptions 
generally minimizes the area of friction between the state and 
religion.  Non-establishment eliminates one of the most crucial 
issues religious groups can fight about with each other and with 
the state, and religious freedom eliminates many of the causes 
of religious friction with the state.  Thus, concern over the 
divisive and potentially threatening nature of conflicts between 
religious groups and the state justify a prudentially established 
combination of religious freedoms and non-establishment. 
 
47.  Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to 
Culture, 61 SOC. RES. 491, 498 (1994). 
48.  2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 11 (2009). 
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1. Debunking the Civil Peace Rationale 
 
The first criticism of the civil peace rationale for non-
establishment is that there is no reason to believe that religion, 
as a general category, is especially divisive.  That is, the civil 
peace rationale does not meet the distinctiveness requirement, 
as it is unclear why divisions or conflicts based on religion are 
“worse than divisions along the lines of race, gender, age, 
ethnicity, or economic class.”49 
In order to distinguish between religion as a general 
category and these other sources of social conflict, it must be 
established that religion is an especially significant cause of 
conflict.  This seems to be historically implausible, at least in the 
case of the United States.  As Michael Smith argues, “[o]ur most 
divisive social issues since the constitutional revolution of 1937 
have included the completion of industrial unionization in the 
late 1930s; McCarthyism in the early 1950s; the campaign for 
racial equality from the middle 1950s onward; prolongation of 
the Vietnam War; and perhaps the Watergate scandal.”50  
Indeed, even putting aside this strong historical counterfactual 
evidence, there remains the strong conceptual problem that the 
characterization of religious belief upon which the civil peace 
rationale apparently relies is not necessarily accurate and may 
not even represent a reasonable supposition.  Many religions 
accept that fallibility and self-deception are mainstays of human 
existence.  Some reject revelation and see religious value in 
human reason and lived experience.  For this reason, many 
liberal religious denominations do not seem more or less 
intolerant than their secular counterparts.51  Consequently, it is 
difficult to support the distinctiveness of the civil peace 
challenge of religion as a general category. 
Even if we do accept that religion causes civil strife in a way 
that warrants special status, it does not follow that the 
appropriate treatment must be strong forms of non-
establishment.  Indeed, Ahdar and Leigh support this argument, 
 
49.  Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment 
Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1838 (2009). 
50.  Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 97 (1983). 
51.  Sapir, supra note 16, at 595–96. 
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claiming that a society in which “a few, more-or-less equal-sized 
religions dominate the landscape is a situation tailor-made for a 
policy of religious tolerance.”52  However, 
 
[A] nation where one religion is dominant (with, 
say, 90 percent adherence) may not need to 
placate the minority religions by adopting a policy 
of toleration.  If the minority faiths are disruptive, 
militant ones, toleration may still be prudent; but 
if the minority religions are quiet, pacifist and 
powerless, suppression may pose few, if any, 
problems.53 
 
Similarly, Michael Sandel points out that “under present 
conditions, such calculations [about how to avoid civil strife] may 
or may not support the separation of church and state . . . .  A 
strict separation of church and state may at times provoke more 
strife that it prevents.”54  That is, there are circumstances in 
which civil peace may not warrant even a weaker, non-coercive, 
interpretation of non-establishment. 
These powerful critiques reflect why the vast majority of the 
scholars criticize the Court’s use of the divisiveness/civil peace 
test.  When it is applied to religion as a general category, it fails 
to persuade that religion is especially divisive in light of 
historical evidence to the contrary, thus failing to meet the 
distinctiveness criteria.  Even if this failure is overcome and 
religion is considered divisive, non-establishment may not 
necessarily alleviate the problem, thereby not meeting the 
cogency criteria.  Non-establishment may, in fact, make the 
problem much worse. 
Closely related to the civil peace rationale is the 
nonalienation rationale. 
 
 
 
B. The Nonalienation Rationale 
 
52.  AHDAR & LEIGH, supra note 13, at 71. 
53.  Id. 
54.  MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF 
A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 64 (1998). 
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Even if the premise that religion as a general category is so 
socially disruptive that it may seriously threaten the political 
order, the possibility that the establishment of religion may 
cause milder political harm must still be considered.  One such 
harm that has received increased attention in recent decades is 
the danger of establishment creating increased political 
alienation among non-adherents.  In the United States, this 
rationale is usually associated with Justice O’Connor’s 
development of what is called the endorsement test.  In her 
concurrence in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,55 Justice O’Connor 
argues that an endorsement of religion 
 
[S]ends a message to non-adherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.  Disapproval 
of religion conveys the opposite message. . . .  We 
live in a pluralistic society.  Our citizens come 
from diverse religious traditions or adhere to no 
particular religious beliefs at all.  If government 
is to be neutral in matters of religion, rather than 
showing either favoritism or disapproval towards 
citizens based on their personal religious choices, 
government cannot endorse the religious practices 
and beliefs of some citizens without sending a 
clear message to non-adherents that they are 
outsiders or less than full members of the political 
community.  An Establishment Clause standard 
that prohibits only “coercive” practices or overt 
efforts at government proselytization . . . but fails 
to take account of the numerous more subtle ways 
that government can show favoritism to 
particular beliefs or convey a message of 
disapproval to others, would not, in my view, 
adequately protect the religious liberty or respect 
the religious diversity of the members of our 
 
55.  492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
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pluralistic political community.56 
 
In this case, the Court appears to be concerned that any 
establishment or endorsement of a religion by the state will 
harm religious minorities and secular citizens, whose “faith will 
not be the one that the government observes and whose symbols 
will not be displayed.”57  That is, endorsement is a symbol that 
the state deems some religious group more “worthy” than others, 
which could lead to some citizens seeing “themselves as 
demeaned and excluded by state institutions . . . .”  As a result, 
“they might physically withdraw from such institutions, come to 
feel alienated from such institutions.”58  The nonalienation 
rationale, then, supports strict non-establishment. 
In order to find that the nonalienation rationale provides 
plausible support for non-establishment, the distinctiveness 
criteria must be met.  The idea here is that religious identity and 
affiliation are a “core part of one’s sense of self.  Other mutable 
attributes, such as political affiliation, are generally viewed as 
more tangential and ephemeral.”59  The centrality of religion 
means that the stakes of being “within or without” religious 
membership, “can be very high: being fulfilled and redeemed or 
eternally damned; being welcomed as a member of the 
community or shunned.”60  These stakes lie at the core of the 
concern with the government favoring religious beliefs “at the 
cost of disparaging others, and further, that the . . . government 
will valorize some citizens at the cost of disparaging others.”61  If 
the idea that endorsement of religion as a general category leads 
to especially high levels of alienation is accepted, it can be 
cogently concluded that strict non-establishment will solve this 
problem. 
 
 
56.  Id. at 625–28 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
57.  1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS & HISTORY 39 
(2010). 
58.  Daniel Brudney, On Noncoercive Establishment, 33 POL. THEORY 812, 
819 (2005). 
59.  Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: 
The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the 
Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 89, 147 (1990). 
60.  CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 61–62 (2007). 
61.  Id. at 62. 
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1. Debunking the Nonalienation Rationale 
 
The fundamental critique of the civil peace rationale as it 
applies to religion as a general category is similar to that applied 
to the nonalienation rationale.  This leads to the question of 
whether endorsement of religion rises to the level of uniqueness 
in creating alienation among citizens, which seems difficult to 
establish affirmatively.  To plausibly meet the uniqueness 
criteria, we must accept that religion is generally more central 
for peoples’ relationship to the state than are their national 
identity or values.  Consequently, the state’s endorsement of a 
religion would alienate more citizens or alienate them in a more 
radical way than would the state’s endorsement or promotion of 
views that conflict with that religion’s morality or group 
identity.  While this premise may apply to a minority of citizens 
holding strong or fundamentalist religious views, it does not 
necessarily apply to a majority of religious adherents. 
Even if the distinctiveness of religion in relation to the 
nonalienation rationale is accepted, the question remains as to 
whether non-establishment would lead to less alienation 
generally.  The evidence indicates otherwise.  Many non-
establishment cases are so controversial that it makes it hard to 
argue that they necessarily, or possibly, reduce citizen 
alienation. 
Although nonalienation is related to the civil peace 
rationale, it appears to lack the self-evident sense of importance 
found in the civil peace rationale.  It seems clear that 
maintaining political stability and preventing serious political 
strife is a meaningful goal.  It is not so clear that preventing 
citizens from being alienated by political decisions rises to this 
level.  Indeed, it seems that in “a pluralistic culture, alienation 
is inevitable.”62  Therefore, it appears that some beliefs and 
values can be included in a nation’s laws and policy, 
notwithstanding any religious content.  The fact that those who 
do not like these beliefs and values may well feel somewhat like 
outsiders63 is not sufficient to justify applying non-establishment 
measures. 
 
62.  Koppelman, supra note 49, at 1840. 
63.  See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: 
Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 
(1987). 
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To conclude, we find that the civil peace and alienation 
rationales fail in both the distinctiveness and cogency 
requirements when applied to religion as a general category.  
The reason for this is perhaps the sheer scope of phenomena 
covered by the general category of religion.  The question then 
arises as to what would happen if these rationales were applied 
to a distinct, but related, subcategory such as religious 
nationality. 
 
III. American Religious Nationality 
 
A. Civic and Religious Nationality 
 
The modern nation-state is expansive, its reach 
encompassing every aspect of social, economic, and political 
life.64  The stability and effectiveness of a state in its national 
form is contingent on its capacity to maintain sovereignty over a 
geographic territory.65  This implies the supremacy of the state 
over other normative structures and power centers.  Indeed, a 
state can be defined by its ability to constrain other potential 
wielders of authority and power.  For the state to be able to 
constantly maintain this monopoly, it must be considered 
legitimate by the citizen body.  That is, the state is reliant on the 
set of beliefs, myths, and ideas that enable its citizens to 
recognize that state power is a force to which they should 
adhere.66  In nation-states, whether liberal or not, the ideologies 
 
64.  See generally GRAEME GILL, THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
MODERN STATE (2016) (reviewing the literature dealing with the attributes of 
the modern nation state). 
65.  Id. at 5.  
 
The modern state is sovereign, or the ultimate source of 
authority within the territory under its jurisdiction . . . .  
Internally, it means that there are no authorities higher than 
the state. The citizen cannot appeal against the state to any 
other authority; the state is supreme, and its will cannot be 
countermanded . . . .  Externally, state sovereignty means 
that other states recognize the authority of a state within its 
borders and accept that that state can speak for its citizens 
in international affairs.  Id. at 8–9. 
 
66.  This idea of legitimacy is broadly based on the idea of constitutional 
legitimacy found in CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 8 (Jeffrey Seitzer 
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explaining and justifying state power can be termed nationality. 
Nationality, understood as a comprehensive category 
including both civic and religious nationality, is an ideology of 
order which joins “state, territory[,] and culture.”67  According to 
Anthony Giddens, nationality is the “cultural sensibility of 
sovereignty.”68  This implies, in part, that the ideology of 
nationality includes an “awareness of being subject to authority 
invested with the power of life and death.”69  It is such an 
ideology which enables the state to hold the monopoly over the 
“legitimate use of physical force”70 within a given territory.  A 
state is a political body which is sovereign over a territory, which 
differs analytically from the concept of a nation.  A nation is a 
type of community which can either support the sovereignty of 
an existing state or promote a political program of the nation 
achieving sovereignty over a territory.71  The development of a 
sense of national unity is a key part of any project of nation-
building.  Historically, the emergence of such “imagined national 
communities”72 across the world marked the “shift from dynastic 
realm to national state.”73  When and where national identity 
and ideology are successfully integrated into the political realm, 
they become unquestionable assumptions for a large majority of 
citizens. 
These definitions do not address the content of the 
narratives through which the connections among nation, 
 
ed., trans., 2d ed. 2008) (1928) (stating “legitimacy is obtained only through 
the representation of the unified will or the historical existence of the people”). 
67.  Roger Friedland, Money, Sex, and God: The Erotic Logic of Religious 
Nationalism, 20 SOC. THEORY 381, 387 (2002). 
68.  2 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE 219 (1985). 
69.  MARK JUERGENSMEYER, THE NEW COLD WAR? RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM 
CONFRONTS THE SECULAR STATE 32 (1993). 
70.  Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in WEBER’S RATIONALISM AND 
MODERN SOCIETY: NEW TRANSLATIONS ON POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY, AND SOCIAL 
STRATIFICATION 9 (Tony Waters & Dagmar Waters eds., trans., 2015) (1946). 
71.  Many minority nationalist groups operate within a social and political 
context of a separate majority nationality.  That is, they have a national project 
which is distinct from the one promoted by the state within which they operate.  
See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY 
OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) (discussing the accommodation of such minority 
national groups in liberal states). 
72.  See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALITY (Verso ed. 2006) (applying, first, the 
concept of imagined communities to national groups). 
73.  GILL, supra note 64, at 102. 
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territory, and culture are established and justified.  It is this 
open-ended nature of nationality which requires an additional 
ideological element.  What is it that connects a particular group 
to a territory?  What is the authority which justifies and 
legitimates a nation-state?  Both the civic and religious varieties 
of nationality differ in their answers to these questions.  I share 
the theoretical position that nationality and religion74 are cut 
 
74.  That defining religion is hard is a fact both true and banal.  However, 
it is still important to offer a plausible working definition.  Minimally then, we 
can define religion as the human response to a reality perceived as sacred.  It 
grounds human experience in a reality which is beyond this world.  
Maintaining this type of enterprise requires massive cultural support.  It is 
thus common to see religions embrace: (1) myths of the sacred origins of the 
world, humanity, and the specific religion; (2) rituals and modes of worship 
that relate the practitioners to the myths and the sacred; and (3) codes of 
conduct which govern the behavior of those who belong to the religion.  See 
SCOTT R. APPLEBY, THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE SACRED: RELIGION, VIOLENCE, AND 
RECONCILIATION 8–9 (1999).  This type of description is suggestive of the 
profound ways in which religion regulates, inspires, and influences human 
society.  One more important aspect is its ability to create order at the face of 
anomic and chaotic human experience.  Clifford Geertz, for example, sees 
religion as attempting to give an ordered coherence to the utter chaos of 
everyday reality; in fact, it is part of his definition of religion, which for him is: 
“(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and 
long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a 
general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura 
of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”  
Clifford Geertz, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CULTURES 90 (1993).  The cosmic disorder can make sense when contrasted 
with Divine order.  In the words of Peter Berger, “the sacred cosmos, which 
transcends and includes man in its ordering of reality, thus provides man its 
ultimate shield against the terror of anomy.”  PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED 
CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION 19 (2011).  One can 
divide the scholarship on the subject of the sacred into two wide tribes: 
phenomenologists on the one hand and culturalists on the other.  The first kind 
examines the sacred as a basic structure of the human experience of the world.  
The latter understands the sacred as an identifiable quality of social life.  The 
sacred is socially/culturally constructed within a specific historical context.  See 
generally GORDON LYNCH, THE SACRED IN THE MODERN WORLD: A CULTURAL 
SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (2012) (exploring the distinction between 
phenomenologists and culturalists).  William James, Rudolf Otto, and Mircea 
Eliade are good representations of phenomenologists.  Otto defines the sacred 
as the experience of mysterium tremendum et fascinans (“overwhelming and 
fascinating mystery”); for him the holy constitutes a category of interpretation 
and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion.  See generally RUDOLF OTTO, 
THE IDEA OF THE HOLY (1958).  For Eliade, sacred time, space, and things 
represent a more intense “reality” around which the rest of the human world 
is structured.  See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: 
THE NATURE OF RELIGION (1959).  On the side of the culturalists we can find 
Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Peter Berger.  Durkheim divides human life 
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from a similar cloth75 and will follow Mark Juergensmeyer’s 
view that both religion and nationality are ideologies of order.  
By this I mean that they are both frameworks that conceive 
 
[Of the] world in coherent, manageable ways; they 
both suggest that there are levels of meaning 
beneath the day-to-day world that give coherence 
to things unseen; and they both provide the 
authority that gives the social and political order 
its reason for being.  In doing so they define for the 
individual the right way of being in the world and 
relate persons to the social whole.76 
 
This view rejects the conception of the state as merely a 
form of social contract or purely democratic institution, and 
replaces it with the idea of a community grounded on a system 
of faith.  A prominent adherent to this view, Anthony Smith, 
asserts that nationality is a system of faith as “binding, ritually 
 
into two symbolic realms: sacred and profane.  The latter is the realm of routine 
experience that we can know through our senses.  We experience this natural 
world of everyday life as comprehensible, knowable and taken-for-granted.  
The sacred, in contrast, is separated from everyday experience; it is an object 
of worship, inspiring feelings of awe among its believers.  Durkheim believes 
that the sacred is a socially constructed symbolic representation of society 
itself.  See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE 
RELIGIOUS LIFE (2008).  Berger represents the most sophisticated version of 
sacred culturalism.  He elaborates the idea, stating that religion is the human 
enterprise by which a sacred social world is established.  PETER L. BERGER, THE 
SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION (1967).  
Since the sacred exists beyond the everyday, but is still experienced through 
rituals and symbols, it is experienced as both being independent of humanity 
and yet being accessible.  The sacred social world is constructed on the 
concreteness of sacred social institutions.  My approach to the sacred is 
culturalist and is roughly based on Berger’s idea. 
75.  For different variations on this idea, see EMILE DURKHEIM, THE 
ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 419 (2008) (“If religion has given 
birth to all that is essential in society, it is because the idea of society is the 
soul of religion”).  See generally CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR 
CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. Chi. 
Press ed. 1985) (1888) (“All significant concepts of the modern theory of the 
state are secularized theological concepts”); Rogers Brubaker, Religion and 
Nationality: Four Approaches, 18 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 2 (2012) (discussing 
the different ways of understanding the relationship of religion and 
nationality). 
76.  JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 69, at 31. 
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repetitive, and collectively enthusing” as any other.77  It also 
involves a “system of beliefs and practices that distinguishes the 
sacred from the profane and unites its adherents in a single 
moral community of the faithful.”78  As Juergensmeyer explains, 
both religion and nationality “are expressions of faith, both 
involve an identity with a loyalty to a large community, and both 
insist on the ultimate moral legitimacy of the authority invested 
in the leadership of the community.”79  It does not follow that 
religious nationality, as it is defined herein, is identical to civic 
nationality.  Rather, the differences between religious and civic 
nationality are comparable to the differences between different 
members of the same species, as opposed to the differences 
between completely alien entities. 
In the United States today, civic nationality and religious 
nationality are the two main narrative variants through which 
territory, state, and culture are connected.  Civic nationality 
justifies government acts and policies on the basis of the 
interests, values, and civic political institutions of “the people.”  
The American people are called to sacrifice in Afghanistan and 
Iraq purportedly in order to promote their democratic values and 
protect the United States from terrorism.  The people are also 
seen as constituting the intrinsic, fundamental authority for the 
United States Constitution.80  In the United States, it is 
commonly understood that the binding agent of “the people” are 
civic institutions.  Civic, or liberal, nationality “locates the 
nation as a group of citizens, each of whom bear, and have a 
history of exercising, the same legal rights vis-à-vis the state.”81 
According to religious nationality, the ultimate provider of 
meaning is not the people but the Divine.  The popular sovereign 
is meaningful only inasmuch as it has a crucial role in the Divine 
plan.  For Christian nationality, the story of the American people 
is not merely one of national liberation from oppressors and 
 
77.  ANTHONY D. SMITH, CHOSEN PEOPLES: SACRED SOURCES OF NATIONAL 
IDENTITY 4–5 (2003). 
78.  Id. at 4–5, 15. 
79.  JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 69, at 16. 
80.  See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 
(1998) (showing how the American people have repeatedly confronted the 
Constitution in the name of the popular sovereign); PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN 
OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997) 
(analyzing the idea that the rule of law is rule of the people). 
81.  Friedland, supra note 67, at 387. 
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subsequent self-definition but is another step in the fulfillment 
of the Divine plan on earth.  Consequently, religious nationality 
holds that religion is the distinguishing and defining 
characteristic of the nation and the State.82  They believe that 
the fundamental authority of state power is “derived from divine 
sources, not from the historical decisions of a particular 
people.”83  Finally, according to adherents on religious 
nationality, the state has a crucial role in the Divine plan or 
process.  For them, national politics are a Divine command.84 
Not all forms of political religion constitute religious 
nationality.  Religious nationality includes only those religious 
movements that view the state not solely as a political 
instrument but rather as a crucial part of their religion.  In the 
words of Roger Friedland: 
 
Religious nationalisms are a particular form of 
politicized religion, that is religious movements 
that engage in political projects that make the 
state not only a medium, but an object, of 
collective action.  The specificity of their project is 
located in their desire to transform the nature of 
the nation-state itself.  They all seek to make 
religion the nation-state’s institutional ground.85 
 
Historically, American civic nationality incorporates and 
supports the two major concepts of liberal secularism and civil 
religion with regard to the relationship of politics and religion.  
Philip Gorski presents this conceptual triangle: “religious 
nationalists wish the boundaries of the religious and political 
communities to be as coterminous as possible; liberal secularists 
seek to keep the religious and political communities as separate 
 
82.  Roger Friedland & Kenneth B. Moss, Thinking Through Religious 
Nationalism, in WORDS: RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE MATTERS 423, 449 (Ernst Van 
Den Hemel & Asja Szafraniec eds., 2016) (stating “[a]t its most basic, religion 
constitutes the ‘we’ of the nation-state”). 
83.  Id. at 450. 
84.  Id. at 449 (stating “the nation itself can have religious meaning if its 
constitution, survival, and actions are understood to have redemptive or 
soteriological significance”). 
85.  Roger Friedland, The Institutional Logic of Religious Nationalism: 
Sex, Violence and the Ends of History, 12 POL., RELIGION & IDEOLOGY 1, 2 
(2011). 
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as possible; and civil religionists imagine the two spheres as 
independent but interconnected.”86  Let us now turn to an 
examination of American civil religion, which will lay the 
groundwork for understanding Christian nationality. 
 
B. American Civil Religion 
 
It is true that not all politicized religion constitutes religious 
nationality.  However, at least in the American case, the 
acceptability and centrality of politicized religion within civic 
nationality has made the political ascendance of Christian 
nationality possible.  This section will focus on how the 
prevailing civil religion in the United States prepared the 
ground for the emergence of Christian nationality.  What 
emerges from this examination is the understanding that the 
political and cultural centrality of the civil religion’s stance that 
politics and religion are interrelated serves to legitimize and 
enable the belief that politics and religion are one and the same. 
As Robert Bellah described, there “exists alongside of and 
rather clearly differentiated from the churches an elaborate and 
well-institutionalized civil religion in America.”87  This civil 
religion has its own set of beliefs, which is maintained and 
developed by various rituals and folk practices.  The civil religion 
also employs narratives which are drawn from Christianity, but 
which operate independently from these origins.  According to 
Bellah, behind the American civil religion lie, “biblical 
archetypes: Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land, New 
Jerusalem, and Sacrificial Death and Rebirth.”88  However, civil 
religion uses these symbolic structures to produce “its own 
prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred 
places, its own solemn rituals and symbols.”89  The central tenet 
of American civil religion is that God has a unique plan and place 
for the United States. 
The religious and biblical interpretation of American 
history can be traced back to the start of the first European 
 
86.  PHILIP GORSKI, AMERICAN COVENANT: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RELIGION 
FROM THE PURITANS TO THE PRESENT 7 (2017). 
87.  Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS: J. AM. 
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 1, 1 (1988). 
88.  Id. at 21. 
89.  Id. 
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colonies in North America.  The early settlers saw their journey 
as a mission to establish a perfect Christian polity.  They 
believed that, like the ancient Israelites, they were called by God 
to be a light onto the nations.90  In a sermon composed while 
sailing towards New England, John Winthrop, one of the 
founders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, declared that upon 
arrival, “[w]e shall find that the God of Israel is among us,” and, 
as a result 
 
[W]e must consider that we shall be as a city upon 
a hill.  The eyes of all people are upon us.  So that 
if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work 
we have undertaken, and so cause Him to 
withdraw His present help from us, we shall be 
made a story and a by-word through the world.”91 
 
In a sermon before a Hartford Congregation in the 17th 
century, Reverend Samuel Wakeman proclaimed that, 
“Jerusalem was, New England is. They were, you are . . . God’s 
covenant people.”92  The Israelites were, for the New 
Englanders, a model to both emulate and transcend.  The 
colonists viewed the newly colonized continent as uniquely 
appropriate for establishing New Jerusalem and bringing about 
redemption.  The theologian Jonathan Edwards declared that 
the new continent was discovered so “that the new and most 
glorious state of God’s church on earth might commence there; 
that God might in it begin a new world in a spiritual respect, 
when he creates the new heavens and new earth.”93  For 
Edwards, Christ’s reign was bound to “begin in America” 
because when God returns, he is likely to wish to start anew: 
“[w]hen God is about to turn the earth into a paradise, he does 
not begin his work where there is some growth already, but in 
 
90.  CONRAD CHERRY, GOD’S NEW ISRAEL: RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF 
AMERICAN DESTINY 27 (1998) (“They believed that, like Israel of old, they had 
been singled out by God to be an example for the nations (especially for 
England).”). 
91.  John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, WINTHROP SOCIETY, 
https://www.winthropsociety.com/doc_charity.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
92.  SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE PURITAN ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SELF 61 
(1975). 
93.  CHERRY, supra note 90, at 55–56. 
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the wilderness.”94  Edwards saw the old world as the place of 
Christ’s crucifixion, and thus “shall not have the honour of 
communicating religion in its most glorious state to us, but we 
to them.”  Furthermore, the fact that “America was discovered 
about the time of the Reformation” was no coincidence for 
Edwards, but rather a sign that the redemption would start in 
the New World.95  By citing from the book of Isaiah, Edwards 
concluded that “the progression of God’s Kingdom had always 
been from east to west: first from Israel to Rome, and now from 
Rome to America.”96 
The American War of Independence, the establishment of 
the United States, and the creation of the Constitution became 
the founding events of the civil religion of the United States.  In 
a sermon entitled “A Sermon on the Commencement of the 
Constitution,” given in 1789, the clergyman Samuel Cooper 
details the “striking resemblance” between the circumstances of 
the new and unique state and “those of the ancient Israelites.”97  
Like the Israelites, “we rose from oppression”; like them, “we 
were led into a wilderness, as a refuge from tyranny”; like them, 
“we have been pursued through the sea”; like them, “we have 
been ungrateful to the Supreme Ruler of the world” and have 
been accordingly punished.98  However, this “day, this 
memorable day, is a witness, that the Lord, he whose hand 
maketh great, and giveth strength unto all, hath not forsaken 
us, nor our God forgotten us.”99  In a similar vein, the 18th 
century clergyman and former president of Harvard University 
Samuel Langdon stated that this “excellent constitution of 
government” was given by “God in the course of his kind 
providence.”100  The colonists’ perception of themselves as New 
Israel became sharper during and after the revolution.  King 
 
94.  Id. at 55–56. 
95.  Id. 
96.  Id. 
97.  A Sermon on the Commencement of the Constitution, TEACHING 
AMERICAN HISTORY, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/a-
sermon-on-the-commencement-of-the-constitution/ (last visited Dec 29, 2019). 
98.  Id. 
99.  ELLIS SANDOZ, POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 
1730–1805: IN TWO VOLUMES 631 (2012). 
100.  Samuel Langdon, Political Sermon at Exeter, New Hampshire: The 
Republic of the Israelites: An Example To The American States (June 5, 1788), 
https://www.consource.org/document/the-republic-of-the-israelites-an-
example-to-the-american-states-by-samuel-langdon-1788-6-5/. 
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George III was cast in the role of Pharaoh, the Atlantic Ocean as 
the Red Sea, George Washington as Moses, and John Adams as 
Joshua.  In fact, Langdon went so far as to suggest that “instead 
of the twelve tribes of Israel, we may substitute the thirteen 
states of the American union.”101  For Ezra Stiles, the former 
president of Yale College, the establishment of the United States 
was a crucial event in the progression of Christianity.  In a 
sermon before the Connecticut Assembly, Stiles maintained that 
all attempts of converting the world to Christianity “shall prove 
fruitless, until the present Christendom itself be recovered to 
primitive purity and simplicity.”102  It is God’s design that 
 
[C]hristianity is to be found in such great purity, 
in this church exiled into the wilderness of 
America; and that its purest body should be 
evidently advancing forward, by an augmented 
natural increase and spiritual edification, into a 
singular superiority—with the ultimate 
subserviency to the glory of God, in converting the 
world.103 
 
The belief in the new nation’s Divine narrative was not 
limited to men of the cloth.  When Congress directed John 
Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson to design a 
seal for the new state, Franklin suggested the image of “Moses 
lifting his hand and the Red Sea dividing, with Pharaoh in his 
chariot being overwhelmed by the waters,”104 and with a motto 
in great popular favor at the time, “[r]ebellion to tyrants is 
obedience to God.”105  Jefferson proposed “a representation of the 
children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and 
pillar of fire by night.”106  In fact, Jefferson concluded his second 
inaugural address with the words, “I shall need . . . the favor of 
 
101.  Id. 
102.  Ezra Stiles, Political Sermon at the General Assembly of the State 
of Connecticut: The United States Elevated to Glory and Honor 57 (1783), 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&context=eta
s. 
103.  Id. 
104.  CHERRY, supra note 90, at 65. 
105.  Id.  
106.  Id. 
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that Being in whose hands we are, who led our fathers, as Israel 
of old, from their native land and planted them in a country 
flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life.”107  For 
Americans at that time, the American Revolution was the era in 
which God had delivered the colonies from Britain (Pharaoh),108 
revealed the role of the nation in the Divine plan, and 
established the fledgling republic as an example of freedom and 
republican government for the rest of the world to see. 
In subsequent decades, the expansion westward and the 
sheer magnitude and wealth of the newly settled land reinforced 
the idea that Americans had been chosen by God.109  It is during 
these early years of growth that the term Manifest Destiny 
became popular.  As Albert Weinberg describes it, Manifest 
Destiny “expressed a dogma of supreme self-assurance and 
ambition—that America’s incorporation of all adjacent lands 
was the virtually inevitable fulfillment of a moral mission 
delegated to the nation by Providence itself.”110  This was 
justified and grounded in the idea that “nature or the natural 
order of things destined natural boundaries for nations in 
general and the United States, the nation of special destiny, in 
particular.”111  Now, during this period of abundance, in contrast 
to earlier manifestations, the reason for the Divine election of 
the United States becomes clear: its geographic bounty, its 
 
107.  Id. at 65. 
108.  Id. at 69–70. 
 
Thus we are acting over the like sins with the children of 
Israel in the wilderness, under the conduct of Moses and 
Aaron, who was leading them out of a state of bondage into a 
land of liberty and plenty in Canaan. Again, we are ready to 
marvel at the unreasonable vileness and cruelty of the 
British tyrant and his ministry, in endeavouring to oppress, 
enslave and destroy these American States, who have been 
some of his most peaceable and profitable subjects. And yet 
we find the same wicked temper and disposition operating in 
Pharaoh king of Egypt above 3000 years ago.  Id. 
 
109.  Id. at 113 (“The magnitude and rich natural resources of the western 
American wilderness strengthened the conviction that Americans were the 
chosen people.  Surely this was a land intended for the new children of Israel.”). 
110.  Id. at 116.  
111.  ALBERT KATZ WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY: A STUDY OF 
NATIONALIST EXPANSIONISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1–2, 43 (1935). 
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superior government, and its moral goodness.112 
The second foundational moment of American civil religion 
is clearly the American Civil War.  Both the Union and the 
Confederacy identified their causes with American Divine 
destiny.  In the North, for example, the clergyman Henry Ward 
Beecher described the war as a fight against Satan: “I thank [the 
Confederacy] that they took another flag to do the Devil’s work 
and left our flag to do the work of God.”113  At the same time, in 
the South, many religious leaders argued that slavery was 
ordained by God, and “the abolition spirit is undeniably 
atheistic,” thus, “we defend the cause of God and religion.”114  
While many interpreted the war as a fight between good and 
evil, some, such as Abraham Lincoln, saw it as a sign of Divine 
punishment for the entire nation.  As Lincoln wrote in a personal 
note late in 1862, “[i]n the present civil war it is quite possible 
that God’s purpose is something different from the purpose of 
either party—and yet the human instrumentalities, working 
just as they do, are of the best adaptation to effect His 
purpose.”115 
Similar ideas suffuse American political discourse to this 
day.  As the historian Conrad Cherry observed 
 
Beheld from the angle of governing mythology, the 
history of the American civil religion is a history 
of the conviction that the American people are 
God’s New Israel, his newly chosen people.  The 
belief that America has been elected by God for a 
special destiny in the world has been the focus of 
American sacred ceremonies, the inaugural 
addresses of our presidents, the sacred scriptures 
of the civil religion.  It has been so pervasive a 
motif in the national life that the word “belief” 
does not really capture the dynamic role that it 
has played for the American people, for it passed 
 
112.  CHERRY, supra note 90, at 117 (“According to the exponents of 
Manifest Destiny, God’s New Israel was elected for clear or manifest reasons—
because of its superior form of government, its geographical location, and its 
beneficence.”) 
113.  Id. at 164. 
114.  Id. at 165. 
115.  Id. at 166. 
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into “the realm of motivational myths.”116 
 
The conviction that America has a divine destiny, and the 
strong analogy with the ancient Israelites, does not mean that 
American civil religion constitutes Christian nationality.  
Adopting Gorski’s approach presented above, religious 
nationalist views call for a unification of politics and religion, 
while civil religion considers politics and religions to be simply 
somewhat connected spheres.  It is possible to believe that the 
United States has been transported through history on the 
wings of providential eagles, while at the same time thinking 
that religion generally, and Christianity specifically, should 
have nothing to do with politics.  Nevertheless, some of the 
thinkers discussed here as representing the tradition of 
American civil religion do come very near religious nationalist 
waters.  For example, the belief of the early Puritans, many of 
whom lived in theocratic colonies, that the Divine calling of the 
New England colonies was to build a perfect Christian polity, 
can clearly be characterized as religious nationalism in nature.  
The close affinity between American civil religion and Christian 
nationality underlies this Article’s argument that America’s civil 
religion facilitated the emergence of a strong form of Christian 
nationality, making it both familiar and legitimate.  The idea 
that Providence can be witnessed in action in the history of the 
United States, a common trope of America’s civil religion, makes 
the idea of the United States as a Christian nation less of a 
radical leap.  The next section will examine American Christian 
nationality. 
 
C. American Christian Nationality 
 
Gorski views American Christian nationality as a “a toxic 
blend of apocalyptic religion and imperial zeal that envisions the 
United States as a righteous nation charged with a divine 
commission to rid the world of evil and usher in the Second 
Coming.”117  As discussed above, adherents of Christian 
nationality see religion and politics as fused, with Christianity 
and citizenship being closely aligned.  According to Gorski, 
 
116.  Id. at 19. 
117.  GORSKI, supra note 86, at 2. 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/8
430 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 40.1 
American religious nationalist ideology is fueled by two biblical 
narratives.  The first is the conquest narrative, as it appears in 
the biblical Prophets, in which the Israelites are commanded to 
conquer the Land of Israel and in which the themes of bloody 
war, animal sacrifice, and Divine interventions are rife.118  In 
the Book of Numbers (33:53), the Israelites are commanded to 
“[t]ake possession of the land and settle in it.”119  This directive 
takes a bloodier turn in Deuteronomy (20:16) where they are 
commanded to “not leave alive anything that breathes”120 in the 
cities that God was giving them.  The utter destruction of the 
people inhabiting the land is justified by the need for religious 
purity.  If those inhabitants were to be kept alive, “they will 
teach you to follow all the detestable things they do in 
worshiping their gods, and you will sin against the Lord your 
God.”121  The conquest narrative is one of holy war and 
settlement expressed in the language of sacrifice and just wars. 
The second Biblical narrative identified by Gorski as 
foundational for American Christian nationality is apocalyptic, 
and “conjures up visions of . . . the rapture such as one [found] 
in the book of Daniel and the Revelation of John.”122  In this 
narrative, the world is in a state of moral decline and natural 
disasters are becoming increasingly frequent.  This is the 
background for an apocalyptic battle between “the forces of good 
and evil,”123 which ultimately destroys the world.  Finally, 
“Christ swoops down from the sky, accompanied by the hosts of 
heaven, to defeat the forces of evil and bind the power of 
Satan.”124  American politics, understood apocalyptically, are a 
stage for a cosmic showdown between God and Satan. 
Although, as earlier discussed, religious nationalist ideology 
has deep roots in American history, reaching back to the colonial 
period, it did not gain significant political potency until the rise 
of the Christian right in the latter half of the 20th century.  It is 
at this point that the narratives of apocalypse and conquest 
 
118.  Id. at 18–20 (describing the dynamic of conquest and apocalypse in 
religious nationality). 
119.  Numbers 33:53. 
120.  Deuteronomy 20:16. 
121.  Deuteronomy 20:18. 
122.   GORSKI, supra note 86, at 19. 
123.  Id. at 22. 
124.  Id. 
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combined to create a true Christian nationality in the United 
States. 
This Part’s goal is to show that modern American Christian 
nationality is a qualitatively different ideology than former 
religious political movements.125  As will be seen, the 
foundations of this relatively new movement are vastly different 
from the more benignly vague civil religious ideas of a 
providential wind filling the sails of the American state, 
replacing the ideology of civil religion with the belief that the 
United States was, and is, a Christian nation and a crucial actor 
in the redemption of the world.  This radical shift involves 
developing a comprehensive political program based on 
supporters of Christian nationality’s strict understanding of 
biblical truth, thereby promoting a vision of the true America 
and of true Americans as being Christian. 
This movement and its ideas—usually referred to as 
Christian conservatism, Christian nationality, or the Christian 
right—represent a major political ideology in contemporary 
American society.126  These terms are also used to refer to a 
 
125.  MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN 
NATIONALISM 6 (2006)  
 
The United States has always been a pious country, given to 
bursts of spiritual fervor, but Christian nationality is 
qualitatively different from earlier religious revivals. Like 
America’s past Great Awakenings, the Christian nationalist 
movement claims that the Bible is absolutely and literally 
true. But it goes much further, extrapolating a total political 
program from that truth, and yoking that program to a 
political party. It is a conflation of scripture and politics that 
sees America’s triumphs as confirmation of the truth of the 
Christian religion, and America’s struggles as part of a 
cosmic contest between God and the devil. It claims 
supernatural sanction for its campaign of national renewal 
and speaks rapturously about vanquishing the millions of 
Americans who would stand in its way.  Id. 
 
126.  In this Article, I will use Christian nationality as the general name 
for American religious nationality, and the Christian Right to mean a more 
concrete political movement constituted by these organizations.  For an 
overview of the rise of the Christian Right, see FRITZ DETWILER, STANDING ON 
THE PREMISES OF GOD: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT’S FIGHT TO REDEFINE AMERICA’S 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1999); MICHAEL LIENESCH, REDEEMING AMERICA: PIETY AND 
POLITICS IN THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT (2014); ANDREW R. MURPHY, PRODIGAL 
NATION: MORAL DECLINE AND DIVINE PUNISHMENT FROM NEW ENGLAND TO 9/11 
(2008). 
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network of political lobbying groups, political actors, and 
religious organizations that began operating in the United 
States in the late 1970’s.127  These include, among others, Jerry 
Falwell’s Moral Majority, Tim LaHaye’s Council for National 
Policy, Beverly LaHaye’s Concerned Women for America, Ed 
McAteer’s Religious Roundtable, and James Dobson’s Focus on 
the Family and Family Research Council.  While many of these 
organizations atrophied and became irrelevant, the relevance 
and power of the Christian nationality movement has endured, 
and the movement remains exceptionally relevant in 
contemporary American politics.  This success can be explained, 
in part, by the ability of the movement to develop “multiple 
power centers, creating a potent combination of organization 
and diffusion.  Its center of gravity shifts constantly, and 
coalitions are forever forming and dissolving . . . .  Any of the 
movement’s figureheads or political allies could fall tomorrow 
and Christian nationalism would thrive undiminished.”128  In 
fact, “[t]he movement is deeply rooted in the American social 
structure, drawing its strength from a vibrant, well-politicized 
religious constituency and from that constituency’s impressive 
organizational infrastructure . . . .  In short, the Christian Right 
will not go away.”129 
 
127.  See Michael J. McVicar, The Religious Right in America, OXFORD 
RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION (2016)  
 
The phrase Religious Right refers to a loose network of 
political actors, religious organizations, and political 
pressure groups that formed in the United States in the late 
1970s. Also referred to as the Christian Right, representative 
organizations associated with the movement included Jerry 
Falwell’s Moral Majority, Tim LaHaye’s Council for National 
Policy, Beverly LaHaye’s Concerned Women for America, and 
Ed McAteer’s Religious Roundtable. Leaders and 
organizations associated with the Religious Right made a 
broad-based religious appeal to Americans that emphasized 
traditional family values, championed free-market 
economics, and advocated a hardline foreign policy approach 
to the Soviet Union. They also criticized secular and 
materialistic trends in American culture that many in the 
Religious Right associated with the moral and economic 
decline of the nation.  Id. 
 
128.  GOLDBERG, supra note 125, at 16. 
129.  DUANE MURRAY OLDFIELD, THE RIGHT AND THE RIGHTEOUS: THE 
CHRISTIAN RIGHT CONFRONTS THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 225 (1996). 
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Although it is possible that Christian nationalist views may 
be quite widely spread amongst American Christians (67% of 
American citizens believe that the United States is a Christian 
nation),130 the recognizable sub-group that represents the best 
representative for American Christian nationality is what John 
Green named “traditionalist evangelicals,” constituting 
approximately 12.6% of American citizens in 2004.131  In a study 
conducted at the end of the 20th century, 92% of evangelical 
Christians said they believed America was founded as a 
Christian nation; the same percent believed that Christian 
values were currently under serious attack; and 95% believed 
that they were witnessing the breakdown of American society.132  
This seems to indicate that Christian nationality is a central 
ideology amongst American evangelicals, which makes it 
significant both politically and culturally. 
After a retreat from politics during the so-called liberal era 
in the United States—from the 1960’s through the early part of 
the 1970’s, when prayer in schools was banned and abortions 
were legalized by the Supreme Court—conservative Christians 
reentered the public sphere during the 1970’s.  Jerry Falwell, 
one of the leading figures of the nascent Christian Right, 
described their reemergence: 
 
Things began to happen.  The invasion of 
humanism into the public school system began to 
alarm us back in the sixties.  Then the Roe v. Wade 
Supreme Court decision of 1973 and abortion on 
demand shook me up.  Then adding to that 
gradual regulation of various things it became 
very apparent the federal government was going 
in the wrong direction and if allowed would be 
harassing non‐ public schools, of which I have one 
of 16,000 right now.  So step by step we became 
 
130.  See Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 69% Say Liberals Too 
Secular, 49% Say Conservatives Too Assertive: Many Americans Uneasy with 
Mix of Religion and Politics, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 24, 2006, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/legacy-pdf/287.pdf. 
131.  John C. Green, The American Religious Landscape and Political 
Attitudes: A Baseline for 2004 (2004), https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/11/2007/10/green-full.pdf. 
132.  CHRISTIAN SMITH ET AL., AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM: EMBATTLED AND 
THRIVING 139 (1998). 
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convinced we must get involved if we’re going to 
continue what we’re doing inside the church 
building.133 
 
According to these modern adherents to Christian 
nationality, America is God’s country and plays a key role in the 
providential plan.  The Christian nationalist version of 
American history is a tale of a Godly country that has been 
corrupted and fell from grace, holding that 
 
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution eroded 
people’s faith in man’s dignity and God’s 
supremacy.  The great universities that once saw 
Christianity as the root of all knowledge turned 
away from scripture and toward the secular 
philosophies of a decadent Europe, which put man 
at the center of the universe.  Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s New Deal brought socialism to 
America and began the process by which 
government, rather than churches, became the 
guarantors of social welfare.134 
 
The fall was even more pronounced in the field of sexuality, 
with homosexuality becoming increasingly mainstream, and 
Christianity being banished from the public sphere.  However, 
according to Christian nationality, God had a plan, and he 
“changed the hearts of a few people, and before long, there was 
a great revival in the country.  Conservative evangelical 
churches mushroomed.  Believers shed their apathy, got 
organized, and elected godly men.”135  This general historical 
narrative promoted by religious nationalist groups is nicely 
captured in The Light and the Glory, an evangelical Christian 
history book, in which the United States is described as a new 
Israel: 
 
In the virgin wilderness of America, God was 
 
133.  ED DOBSON ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTALIST PHENOMENON: THE 
RESURGENCE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANITY 144 (1981). 
134.  GOLDBERG, supra note 125, at 7. 
135.  Id. at 8. 
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making His most significant attempt since 
ancient Israel to create a new Israel of people 
living in obedience to the laws of God, through 
faith in Jesus Christ.  Not surprisingly, Christian 
Nationalist histories go back to the Puritans.  It 
was them, they contend, who “made possible 
America’s foundation as a Christian nation.”136 
 
Again, in the words of Falwell: 
 
The heritage of the Puritan Pilgrims is one not of 
a church, but of a nation; these were men and 
women who were not only the progenitors of a 
state, but also the ancestors of a nation.  We can 
thank these courageous people who laid the 
religious foundation of our nation for the freedom 
and liberty we so liberally enjoy today.137 
 
For Christian evangelicals, the United States was founded 
according to the Divine plan, and its society and politics should 
adhere to God’s laws.  Like ancient Israel, the United States is 
an attempt to bring redemption to the world, and it is a major 
actor in the struggle against evil.  Central for the Christian 
nationalist worldview is the idea of the corruption of America.  
The status of the United States as a redemptive force is under 
constant peril in their eyes, being challenged by those who try to 
secularize society.  These challenges are reflected most 
powerfully in the new social acceptance of abortion and LGBT 
rights, which the Christian evangelicals consider abhorrent 
behavior.  These issues help animate Christians’ call for action.  
Adherents of Christian nationality are “troubled patriots, who 
believe that America has broken its covenant and drifted from 
its original purpose.  Thus they are determined to bring their 
country back to its spiritual beginnings, reminding Americans 
repeatedly that theirs is a biblical republic.”138  The ideology of 
the contemporary American religious nationalist critique is “an 
indictment of national sin” based on a “story of a prodigal nation 
 
136.  LIENESCH, supra note 126, at 141. 
137.  Id. at 145. 
138.  Id. at 155. 
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that has fallen away from its covenant.”139  For supporters of 
Christian nationality, the legalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade 
is central to the understanding of American moral decline.  
Falwell writes that “if we expect God to honor and bless our 
nation, we must take a stand against abortion.”140  This is a 
powerful call for action: the United States has strayed from its 
Divine path, and it is up to the adherents of American religious 
nationality to redeem it. 
Christian nationality sees the political legitimacy of the 
American state as grounded on being a Christian nation in 
covenant with God.  It is believed that the United States has a 
crucial role to play in the unfolding of God’s plan.  As a result, 
any unwillingness to follow biblical principles and the outline of 
this plan will result in great harm both to the nation and the 
world.  It follows that the state must act in accordance with 
Christian norms.  The Christian nationalist narrative calls for a 
unification of religion and politics, with the latter subservient to 
the former.  The strongest version of this view, held by a 
minority of backers of Christian nationality, is Dominionism, 
which represents the “idea that Christians have a God-given 
right to rule.”141  People who hold this view, or Dominion 
theologians, believe that “the inheritors and custodians of this 
world are Christians who can ‘name it and claim it’ by divine 
right.”142  Christian Reconstructionists, the sect which 
introduced Dominionism to the American scene, advocate for the 
replacement of “American civil law with Old Testament biblical 
law.”143  In recent decades, the “tone” of Dominion theology has 
“softened and it has become increasingly palatable to 
mainstream evangelicals.”144  While it is still a marginal position 
even within Christian nationalist circles, its extreme positions 
help expose the crucial difference between American civil 
religion and American Christian nationality.  The latter, even in 
its milder forms, calls for the unification of politics and religion 
 
139.  MURPHY, supra note 126, at 88. 
140.  Id. at 90–91. 
141.  GOLDBERG, supra note 125, at 13. 
142.  GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 174 
(1990). 
143.  GOLDBERG, supra note 125, at 13. 
144.  James Aho, Christian Heroism and the Reconstruction of America, 
39 CRITICAL SOC. 545, 546 (2012). 
41
2019 THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 437 
and insists that America is a Christian nation and must behave 
accordingly.  This is why the legalization of abortion and same-
sex marriage, as examples of anti-biblical state behavior, 
became the rallying cry of Christian nationality. 
The belief in the necessary confluence of religion and politics 
makes Christian nationality a powerful and comprehensive 
political ideology.  The civil religious position that politics and 
religion are somewhat related is, in contrast, quite weak.  The 
idea that the United States is a shining city upon a hill, and that 
it has a proactive and providential role in the world, does not 
necessitate the aggressive involvement of any particular 
religious view in political disputes.  This ideological distinction 
and the interrelationships among civil religion, Christian 
nationality, and civic nationality will be discussed next. 
 
D. Intimate Rivalry 
 
The civil religion tradition represents a major strain in 
American civic nationality in that it is a valid and fully 
acceptable part of public discourse which supports the 
legitimacy of state authority.  Civic nationality is a “master 
narrative,” or a set of stories that make political authority 
legitimate or illegitimate to the people.  Master narratives are 
ways of assembling popular social movements and coalitions so 
that they have the potential to create dramatic changes in 
politics.145  The master narrative of civic nationality is comprised 
of a set of stories which legitimize the state as it currently is, not 
necessarily in all its details, but in the perception of its basic 
character.  These narratives are supported by the state through 
rituals, education, and rhetoric.146  They are also produced 
 
145.  ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND CIVIC LIFE: HINDUS AND 
MUSLIMS IN INDIA 55 (2002).  
 
By “master narratives” I mean the major organizing devices 
for mass politics, or the leading political idioms that mobilize 
large numbers of people.  Master narratives tell stories that 
make the critical issues in politics intelligible to the masses.  
They are ways of putting together popular social coalitions so 
that politics can be altered and political power won.  Id. 
 
146.  See generally DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER (1988) 
(explaining the centrality or rituals in political life). 
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independently from the state in the private sector, in popular 
culture, and literature.147  The content and limits of civic 
nationality are in constant flux.  In any society, but especially in 
a pluralist and democratic environment, many voices may be 
found competing to have their legitimacy enhanced by being 
perceived as an integral part of mainstream national culture.  
Crucially, being perceived as not being a part of the “legitimate” 
discourse of civic nationality can generate immense opposition 
to ideological positions and political movements.  It suffices to 
recall the extensive cultural, political, and legal hostility once 
directed against the American Communist Party. 
American mainstream nationality is primarily civic and 
liberal, consisting of a narrative centered on the will, interests, 
and values of the American people.  However, this secular 
narrative exists in a symbiotic relationship with the narratives 
of American civil religion.  It is this alliance which makes 
Christian nationality a palatable voice in American politics. 
The argument developed in this Part is that although 
Christian nationality promotes positions which differ radically 
from—and, in fact, are adverse to—those of today’s civic 
nationality, Christian nationality faces almost no resistance.  
This may be due to the intersections between the ideas of 
Christian nationality and those of the American civil religion.  
As stated previously, the two ideologies hold fundamentally 
different positions regarding the relationship of the state to 
religion.  Nevertheless, the ideas and positions of America’s civil 
religion, which have been, and still remain, part of the 
mainstream of political discourse in the United States, make 
Christian nationalist ideology sound acceptable and legitimate 
to many.  This relationship can be labelled overlapping 
legitimation.  Both narratives operate concurrently in society to 
explain and justify state authority. 
In the master narratives of both civic and Christian 
nationality, authority rests in the metaphysical realm.  The 
Divine is an analogous cultural institution to the sovereign, 
making the Divine and the sovereign potential rivals; both can 
potentially guarantee order in society and both claim final, 
supreme authority.  Crucially, they also both give moral 
 
147.  E.g., PAUL W. KAHN, FINDING OURSELVES AT THE MOVIES: PHILOSOPHY 
FOR A NEW GENERATION (2013) (holding that the cultural imagination of 
popular sovereignty is maintained by popular culture). 
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credence to life-and-death decisions, including the right to kill 
and the call to make a sacrifice.148  It is an oxymoron to imagine 
two entities as being supreme, as one can be called to sacrifice 
either by the sovereign or by God, but not by both.149  Thus, 
either God or the sovereign can decide matters of life and death, 
but not both. 
The United States Constitution is a good example of a civic 
nationalist text, as demonstrated by its opening words: “We the 
People of the United States” that “ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.”150  There is no 
mention of God as the ultimate authority behind the state.  It is 
the will of the popular sovereign that is the source of the law and 
the foundation of the nation itself.151  Contrast this with the 
many different proposals for a Christian amendment to the 
constitution which often include the words, “Almighty God as 
the source of all authority and power in civil government,” or 
state that they accept the “Divine Authority of the Holy 
Scriptures, the law of God as the paramount rule.”152 
A major force behind the strength of the Christian 
nationalist narrative is the idea that civic or secular nationality 
 
148.  See generally JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 69, at 32 (stating “the 
awareness of being subject to an authority—an authority invested with the 
power of life and death—gives nationality its potency”); PAUL W. KAHN, 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 7 
(2011) (“Liberal theory puts contrast at the origins of the political community; 
political theology puts sacrifice at the point of origin.”). 
149.  Roger Friedland, Religious Nationalism and the Problem of 
Collective Representation, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 125, 128 (2001) (“Religious 
discourse is replete with martial metaphor, of battles and enemies, of position 
and siege . . . .  Religion, a cosmology accomplished through violence, its cosmic 
war vicariously experienced and domesticated by rite, is thus inherently a 
natural competitor to the nationality of the secular state.“). 
150.  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
151.  PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 17 (2005)  
 
The sovereign will, we say, is the source of law, and indeed of 
the nation itself. To identify with the popular sovereign is to 
understand the self in and through will. It is to read the self—
quite literally the finite body—as a point of access to, and 
expression of, the nation, which confronts us as an ultimate 
value.  Id. 
 
152.  DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD’S OWN PARTY: THE MAKING OF THE 
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 17 (2010) (explaining that similar language was part of the 
Constitution of the Confederate States).  
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is a corrupting ideology.  That is, that only Christian nationality 
authentically represents what the nation was once and what it 
ought to be.  In the United States, the ideology of Christian right 
is an indictment of American secularism and liberalism.  The 
emergence and increasing strength of these ideological forces 
after the 1960’s in the face of what they called “secular 
humanism” was accompanied by placing blame on the United 
States for leaving the divine path and losing God’s protection.153  
Pat Robertson tells the story: 
 
Until modern times, the foundations of law rested 
on the Judeo‐ Christian concept of right and 
wrong and the foundational concept of Original 
Sin . . . .  Modern, secular sociology, however, 
shuns such biblical teachings in favor of an 
evolutionary hypothesis based on the ideas of 
Darwin, Freud, Einstein, and others.  This view, 
often called “secular humanism,” takes the view 
that man has evolved from the slime and that with 
time and ever greater freedoms, mankind will 
ascend to the stars.  These ideas, which are 
contrary to the Word of God, have led directly to 
the bitter conflict and social chaos of our day . . . .  
The legacy of the 1960s is still with us today.  The 
free‐ love, anti‐ war, psychedelic 1960s 
proclaimed not only the right of dissent but the 
right to protest against and defame the most 
sacred institutions of the nation.154 
 
The corrupting influence of American liberal humanism is a 
cause and a call for Christian action, as Jerry Falwell describes 
it: 
 
 
153.  See MURPHY, supra note 126, at 80 (“From the beginning, the 
Christian Right had been driven by a powerful narrative of imperiled national 
promise, of a prodigal yet once chosen nation that had forsaken its moral and 
spiritual foundations in favor of secular humanism.”); John Keller, The Two 
Jeremiads in American Political Thought, W. POL. SCI. ASS’N 2011 ANN. 
MEETING PAPER (Feb. 22, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1766824. 
154.  PAT ROBERTSON, THE TURNING TIDE 112–13 (1993). 
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Things began to happen.  The invasion of 
humanism into the public school system began to 
alarm us back in the sixties.  Then the Roe v. Wade 
Supreme Court decision of 1973 and abortion on 
demand shook me up . . . .  So step by step we 
became convinced we must get involved if we’re 
going to continue what we’re doing inside the 
church building.155 
 
The narrative contrasts this corrupt, inauthentic national 
existence with both the shining past and with contemporary 
Christian communities.  In the words of Bruce Lincoln, “[t]here 
is a good, faithful Christian America that has been brought to 
mortal peril by the actions and views of another part of the 
nation that is secular and immoral.  Secular America was the 
problem, to which Christian America . . . was the solution.”156  
Consequently, supporters of Christian nationality see it as their 
duty to bring America back into the grace of God. 
When religious nationality is a legitimate part of the 
national narrative, its adherents are able to promote their point 
of view and agenda by using the political machine of the state.  
Although they hold a radically different understanding of the 
state, and call for major transformation of that state, the fact 
that they are seen as a plausible and acceptable part of the 
national narrative means that they do not meet the same 
exclusionary and aggressive opposition met by others.  This 
creates a relationship of intimate rivalry, which is quite unique.  
In fact, due to the fact that Christian nationality is a socially 
plausible legitimating narrative of the state, it is able to present 
itself as merely a reforming force.  In this manifestation, the 
state has been corrupted and led away from its wholesome roots 
by civic nationality and liberalism, and needs to be shepherded 
back by the religious nationalists. 
This vision is captured well by the softer-spoken founder of 
the Christian Coalition, Ralph Reed, who promises in his book 
that if Christian activists had their way 
 
 
155.  ED DOBSON ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTALIST PHENOMENON: THE 
RESURGENCE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANITY 144 (Jerry Falwell ed., 1981). 
156.  BRUCE LINCOLN, HOLY TERRORS: THINKING ABOUT RELIGION AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11, at 38 (2d ed. 2006). 
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America would look much as it did for most of the 
first two centuries of its existence, before the 
social dislocations caused by Vietnam, the sexual 
revolution, Watergate, and the explosion of the 
welfare state.  Our nation would once again be 
ascendant, self‐ confident, proud, and morally 
strong.  Government would be strong, the 
citizenry virtuous, and mediating institutions 
such as churches and voluntary organizations, 
would carry out many of the functions currently 
relegated to the bureaucracy.157 
 
This America, Reed proclaims, is the authentic America.  By 
actively engaging in politics, winning elections, and confirming 
sympathetic judges, the Christian right will be able to beat back 
the forces of secularism and “[t]ake America [b]ack.”158 
Due to the relatively broad acceptability of their national 
Christian message, and the fact that many of their beliefs 
overlap with those held by other groups, including 
conservatives, libertarians, and non-nationalist religious 
groups, the Republican Party (“the GOP”) has been able to 
integrate Christian right into its ideologies and become highly 
influential.159  Although they do not hold sway over American 
politics as a whole, the Christian right has exerted its political 
power within the GOP, and adherents of Christian nationality 
have become a major force within the GOP in the last few 
decades.  As Daniel Williams wrote in his book about the rise of 
the Christian right, while “evangelical Christians had become 
Republicans, the Republican Party had also become 
Christianized, and it was becoming increasingly difficult to tell 
the difference between the Christian Coalition’s issue positions 
and the GOP platform.”160  Their near-domination of one of the 
two major political parties is an immense achievement for 
Christian nationality and was a result of decades-long political 
action.  During this time 
 
157.  RALPH REED, POLITICALLY INCORRECT: THE EMERGING FAITH FACTOR 
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 36–37 (1994). 
158.  Id. at 37. 
159.  See FRANCES FITZGERALD, THE EVANGELICALS: THE STRUGGLE TO 
SHAPE AMERICA 411 (Simon & Schuster ed., 2017). 
160.  WILLIAMS, supra note 152, at 231. 
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Conservative Christians have flocked to local and 
state party caucuses, taking control of the 
Republican apparatus in at least eighteen 
states—not only evangelical strongholds in the 
South but also such apparently unlikely places as 
Minnesota, Iowa, and Oregon.  By conventional 
wisdom, about one-fourth of the delegates to the 
Republican national convention are thought to be 
affiliated with this bloc, giving them substantial 
platform influence.161 
 
This made the Christian right the de facto king makers in the 
GOP. 
The presentation of Christian nationality—not as a 
revolutionary force but as a legitimate opposition—has also been 
facilitated by Christian nationality’s basic acceptance of the idea 
of democratic rule.  That is, they accept “the political apparatus 
of the modern nation-state.”162  Most Christian nationalist 
leaders and thinkers consider both democracy and the 
Constitution extremely important.  The agenda of Christian 
nationality takes issue with the content and source of authority 
of politics, but not with the form they currently take.  Although 
some supporters of Christian nationality see democracy only as 
a means to achieving a theocracy,163 the mainstream voices see 
it, and constitutional republicanism, as “most consistent with 
the biblical view of the nature of man and the danger of 
power,”164 and, therefore, as “the one great hope of freedom in a 
sin-cursed world.”165 
The evidence indicates that Christian nationalist ideology 
represents a fundamental alternative to American civic 
nationality.  Its adherents are able to present themselves as the 
 
161.  KENNETH D. WALD & ALLISON CALHOUN-BROWN, RELIGION AND 
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 230 (6th ed. 2010). 
162.  JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 69, at 6. 
163.  GEORGE GRANT, THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD: BIBLICAL PRINCIPLES 
FOR POLITICAL ACTION 51 (Gary North ed., 1987). 
164.  JOHN EIDSMOE, GOD AND CAESAR: BIBLICAL FAITH AND POLITICAL 
ACTION 17 (1997). 
165.  ED DOBSON & EDWARD E. HINDSON, THE SEDUCTION OF POWER: 
PREACHERS, POLITICS AND THE MEDIA 131 (1988). 
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carriers of the true, pure nature of the nation-state.  They also 
accept and use the current political mechanisms of the nation-
state, including democracy, to advance their agenda.  As a result, 
Christian nationality, unlike other forms of threatening 
opposition, such as communism or minority nationality, is able 
to co-exist with civic nationality while vying for political and 
cultural power. 
This thick account of Christian nationality—both historical 
and contemporary—will be key in demonstrating that the 
political division theory—when applied to it—is persuasive.  
This is the task of the next Part. 
 
IV. Christian Nationality and the Political Division Theory 
 
Part II of this Article laid out the political division theory 
and its main critiques.  It demonstrated that when applied to 
religion generally, the political division theory makes little 
sense.  Part III turned to the history and ideology of American 
Christian nationality and offered a new conceptualization of its 
relationship with American national identity: intimate rivalry.  
This Part will strive to show that when applied to Christian 
nationality, the political division theory is plausible and useful.  
I will present this in two stages: first, arguing that this religious 
nationalist ideology is uniquely divisive and perilous (the 
distinctiveness criteria); and second, arguing that it can be 
prevented by a strict interpretation of non-establishment (the 
cogency criteria). 
 
A. The Distinctiveness of Christian Nationality 
 
What makes Christian nationality unique through the 
prism of the political division theory is that it promotes the idea 
that the American identity is grounded in a specific religion.166  
National identity can be more or less inclusive and more or less 
morally and politically attractive.167  In order to understand this 
 
166.  GORSKI, supra note 86, at 7 (explaining that religious nationalists 
wish the boundaries of the religious and political communities to be as 
coterminous as possible; liberal secularists seek to keep the religious and 
political communities as separate as possible; and civil religionists). 
167.  See generally CRAIG J. CALHOUN, NATIONALISM (1997); MARGARET 
CANOVAN, NATIONHOOD AND POLITICAL THEORY (1998); SMITH, supra note 77. 
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spectrum, we must distinguish between the encompassing 
nature of all state-oriented national identities (such as civil 
nationality and Christian nationality) and how inclusive they 
make membership in the common political identity.  By the 
encompassing nature, I mean the fact that it both sees the state 
and the entire citizen body as their subject.  In this sense, all 
national identities are—to a large extent—exclusionary: they 
rely on a strong distinction between members and non-members 
and are naturally hostile towards competing national 
movements.168  The key conceptual point, because the 
encompassing nature is a constant in all state-oriented national 
identities, is that the main moral distinction between national 
identities is going to be the inclusivity of their membership 
threshold.  In cases (like Christian nationality) in which the 
ideology is exclusive and intolerant, the encompassing nature of 
national identities exacerbates the moral problem tenfold.  
When a reclusive religious group is intolerant, the fact that they 
seek to separate themselves from the state and society makes it 
possible to resolve the issue by cultural accommodation.  This is 
not true when we combine an encompassing nationality with an 
intolerant ideology.  In this case, the subject of the exclusivity 
and intolerance becomes the state itself.  This is the reason that 
promoting American identity, which is grounded in a specific 
religion, poses an especially severe danger for political division.  
How does this take shape in the case of Christian nationality? 
The center of American Civic nationality, for instance, is 
commonly held to be a much more morally palatable form of 
common political identity.  This inclusivity seems to derive from 
at least two sources.  The first is the fact that civil American 
identity is grounded in a common political/legal project and 
values that are often seen as encapsulated by the 
Constitution.169  If an American is defined by being a part of the 
 
168.  SCHMITT, supra note 75, at 28 (“The distinction of friend and enemy 
denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an 
association or disassociation [sic] . . . [the enemy] is, in an especially intense 
way, existentially something different and alien, so that in extreme cases 
conflicts with him are possible.”). 
169.  CRAIG CALHOUN, NATIONS MATTER: CULTURE, HISTORY, AND THE 
COSMOPOLITAN DREAM 42 (2007) (“[C]ivic nations can in principle be open to 
anyone who agrees to follow their laws.  Citizenship in the state is seen as 
primary rather than prior membership in a descent group or cultural 
tradition.”). 
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political project of the United States, then joining the nation is 
quite possible.  This is in contrast to more ethnic nations which 
are connected by an imagined primordial, pre-political, ties.170  If 
being Danish is being a part of the “ethnos” of Danes, it is all but 
impossible for an immigrant to join.  The second reason behind 
the inclusivity of American Civic nationality is that it is an 
ambiguous and thin political ideology.  As Craig Calhoun puts 
it: “civic nations can in principle be open to anyone who agrees 
to follow their laws.  Citizenship in the state is seen as primary, 
rather than prior membership in a descent group or cultural 
tradition.”171  The legitimacy generated by American Civic 
nationality comes with very little concrete ideological strings, 
and is thus “relatively flexible and all purpose.”172  American 
civil nationality is concerned with the ultimate source of political 
legitimacy—”We the People”—but is not attached to a well-
defined political ideology.  Agreeing that “the People” are the 
source of political authority is far easier than accepting that the 
United States has a crucial role to play in the Divine plan.  This 
makes the unifying civil identity in the United States quite 
inclusive, potentially including all individuals (or citizens) 
within its boundaries.  The fact that American Civic nationality 
is grounded on participation in a political project, and that it is 
ideologically ambiguous, makes it perfectly suited for creating 
social solidarity in a nation as diverse and populous as the 
United States. 
This is not true in the case of Christian nationality.  The 
first issue here is the explosive combination of the normative 
thickness of religion with the encompassing nature of a 
nationalist ideology.  As I just stated, a part of the political 
attractiveness of American Civic nationality is that it is a thin 
(and thus more easily inclusive) ideology.  Christian nationality 
is on the other side of the spectrum: it attaches American 
national identity to a very limited set of ideological options and 
to membership in one (albeit diverse) religious group.  It is true 
that religion as a defining feature of a nation functions 
differently than ethnicity: there is perhaps more of a possibility 
 
170.  Id. at 41 (“Ethnic nationalism, conversely, refers precisely to rooting 
political identity and obligation in the existence of a prepolitical collective 
unit—the nation—which achieves political subjectivity by virtue of the state.”). 
171.  Id. at 42. 
172.  CANOVAN, supra note 167, at 74. 
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for a newcomer to “convert” into “We the People” than to join a 
group unified by primordial ties.  However, this does not mean 
that Christian nationality is able to fulfill the solidarity 
enhancing role of civic nationality.  Equating being an American 
with being a Christian is quite literally to cause “political 
division along religious lines,” which is, in the words of Chief 
Justice Burger, “one of the principal evils against which the 
First Amendment was intended to protect.”173  By equating the 
nation with religion, Christian nationality implies that someone 
who is not of the faith cannot be a “true” American.  This leaves 
a large percent of the citizen body unavoidably feeling alienated 
and excluded.  Combine this with the heavy political and moral 
ideological baggage of Christian nationality, which is not only 
invested in defining the American people, but also with the ways 
in which they and their country conducts themselves.  Here, we 
find a political identity and ideology which is deeply invested in 
both identifying the ultimate authority (the Divine) and laying 
down significant ideological constraints on the operation of 
political authority and on membership in the nation.174  America 
is not only a Christian nation, but it must also act as one.  This 
brings us right back to the political division theory, which comes, 
in the words of Justice Black, to prevent linking “state and 
churches together in controlling the lives and destinies of our 
citizenship—a citizenship composed of people of myriad religious 
faiths, some of them bitterly hostile to and completely intolerant 
of the others.”175  Although this may not be a valid concern when 
applied to other reclusive religious groups, like the Old Order 
Amish, it is directly relevant when applied to a religious ideology 
whose subject is the identity and behavior of the state itself. 
The status of Christian nationality as an intimate rival in 
American politics and culture makes its divisive potential even 
more pronounced.  The status of intimate rivalry means that the 
supporters or Christian nationality are spared much of the 
political, legal, and cultural pressures other radical groups face.  
For example, compare the moral and political rejection quite 
justly experienced by white nationalist groups in the United 
States with the way in which the GOP has embraced Christian 
 
173.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). 
174.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
175.  Bd. of Educ. Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
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nationality.176  This rejection occurs despite the fact that many 
of the policies promoted by white nationality and Christian 
nationality actually overlap.177  Being a legitimate part of the 
political culture allows Christian nationality to escape much of 
this disapprobation and, even more significantly, enables it to 
harness the political and legal institutions of the state for its 
own goals.  Using this institutional capacity, American 
Christian nationality, as an intimate rival, is able to apply its 
encompassing and intolerant ideology in ways unavailable to 
other groups seeking to transform the regime, whether from the 
right or the left, thus creating a profoundly uneven democratic 
playing field.  It is hard to identify another political movement 
which enjoys this status. 
Christian nationality tends to reflect fundamentalist, 
orthodox religious convictions.178  Religious national movements 
are revivalist in nature, presenting themselves as strong 
alternatives to civic nationality and the western “corruption” of 
liberalism.  They are often reliant on a strong redemptive 
narrative, which justifies, or even demands, intense state 
intervention in the social and moral life of citizens.179  Groups 
like those in the Christian right “seek to protect and deepen 
religious identity—to promote a formidable religious presence—
by competing with other religious movements and with secular 
institutions and philosophies for resources and allegiances.”180  
In fact, the collective identity of adherents to Christian 
nationality may make their need to distinguish themselves from 
other groups even stronger than that of other fundamentalist 
religious groups.  For example, studies have found that 
“Christian nationalism influences whites’ regulating of racial 
boundaries (evidenced in intermarriage attitudes) above and 
beyond the independent effects of political conservatism or 
religious exclusivism.”181  The same holds true regarding animus 
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towards immigrants.182  The belief that the United States is a 
Christian nation also “increases desires for group conformity 
and strict control for both criminals and ‘troublemakers.’”183  
Some sociologists suggest that the reason for the hybrid identity 
of Christian nationality, or even religious nationality generally, 
is that the more unified one’s identity, the higher the perception 
of threat from outsiders.184  Because the identity of adherents of 
Christian nationality is more unified than that of other 
adherents to strong religions which also may have national 
identities, it is highly plausible that supporters of Christian 
nationality are less tolerant.  In short, the members of the 
Christian right tend to hold a range of fundamentalist religious 
beliefs and engage in fundamentalist religious practices, which 
provide them with their sources of loyalty and knowledge in 
society.  Consequently, there is strong evidence to support a 
presumption of intolerance associated with the category of 
religious nationality, in contrast to the category of general 
religious belief.  At the very least, this presumption is valid 
regarding the religious understanding of the legitimacy and 
purpose of the state.  Religious nationality is often in the position 
of both rejecting the rule of reason and accepting revelation as 
the basis for its ideology.  While it cannot be said that religion 
generally produces more intolerance and is thus especially 
divisive, in the case of religious nationality, it is reasonable to 
argue that it does produce more intolerance and is especially 
divisive. 
It can, therefore, be seen that Christian nationality is an 
ideology that is very likely to be intolerant; that has a deeper, 
more divisive and alienating understanding of the state; and is 
uniquely situated to influence and even dramatically transform 
the state.  Christian nationality transforms the struggle for 
political power and state support into a religious conflict with 
both other religions and adherents of civic nationality.  These 
characteristics form the basis of the distinctiveness of Christian 
nationality in light of the civil peace and alienation rationales. 
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Given that this description of the distinctiveness of 
Christian nationality’s challenge to the civil peace is accepted, 
the cogency criteria must then be examined.  I argue that the 
cogency criterion is met, thus supporting a policy of non-
establishment. 
To understand this conclusion, the first step is to examine 
the proposition that the encompassing and public nature of 
Christian nationality makes other measures, such as freedom of 
religion, less effective in achieving a modus vivendi.  This means 
that the “Jeffersonian compromise,” described by Richard Rorty 
as the idea that “we shall not be able to keep a democratic 
political community going unless the religious believers remain 
willing to trade privatization for a guarantee of religious 
liberty,”185 does not apply to Christian nationality.  If religious 
freedoms and exemptions are sufficient to sustain a relatively 
strife-free relationship between religious groups and the state, 
then strict or neutral non-establishment does not follow from the 
political division theory.  In constitutional language, this means 
that if guaranteeing the free exercise of religion is sufficient to 
produce and sustain civil peace, why is non-establishment, 
understood through the prism of the political division theory, 
necessary?  However, because the ideological subject matter of 
Christian nationality is the identity and behavior of the United 
States as a whole, providing exemptions from generally 
applicable laws does nothing to mitigate or eliminate Christian 
nationality’s belief that the United States is being corrupted by 
the current ruling ideologies of civic nationality and liberalism.  
Adherents to Christian nationality are deeply interested in 
“dominating the realms of American institutional morality . . . 
or simply put, creating a state beholden to Christian beliefs.”186  
Ensuring that the state does not coerce them into acting against 
their deeply held beliefs is simply insufficient in the case of an 
ideology which is interested in coercing the state to behave in 
accordance with their beliefs.  A plausible solution to this 
problem is to apply non-establishment in order to make it harder 
for Christian nationality to succeed in transforming the state 
and the public sphere into a less inclusive, more Christian, place. 
The intimate rivalry of Christian nationality is another 
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reason which makes non-establishment an especially relevant 
remedy.  One can argue that because Christianity is a part of the 
overlapping legitimation of the state, it is already partially and 
informally established.  While it is implausible that anyone 
would state that the United States is a Jewish country, for many 
Americans it is perfectly reasonable to state that it is a Christian 
country.  In essence, according to the political division theory 
presented herein, there is no need to be especially concerned 
with the establishment of any of the minority religions.  In 
contrast, the fact that Christianity is already so ingrained in 
American civic nationality makes establishment of Christianity 
an actual risk.  This prospect, combined with the ideological 
imperative of transforming the United States into a Christian 
nation, strengthen the case for non-establishment.  If the status 
of intimate rivalry makes Christian nationality uniquely 
capable of influencing the state, then it is both judicious and 
prudent to make the wall of separation both high and formal. 
If the civil peace and alienation rationales convincingly 
apply only to religious nationality or similar ideologies, why not 
just forbid the state from being involved in institutions and 
policies related to Christian nationality?  Why is across-the-
board non-establishment necessary to prevent just one type of 
state-religion entanglement?  There are two main reasons.  The 
first is that it is impossible for a court to distinguish accurately 
between what constitutes civil peace endangering type of 
religion and a benign one.  That is, the fact that Christian 
nationality should be kept at arm’s length does not mean that 
this can be translated into useful, and even somewhat accurate, 
judicial tools.  In short, the inability to fairly identify the sub-
category of Christian nationality makes it necessary to separate 
a more recognizable criterion: that of “religion” from the state.  
This is a similar case to that of freedom of speech protections 
under the First Amendment.  Here, although not all speech is 
actually valuable and, thus, warrants protection, courts are 
perceived as inappropriate institutions to make this distinction.  
Thus, First Amendment doctrine protects a much wider category 
of speech than what is actually valuable speech.187  In analogy, 
the political division theory, as presented here, seeks to prevent 
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a certain type of political danger posed by a particular kind of 
establishment.  However, since courts are not equipped to decide 
which religious phenomena is actually dangerous, the 
constitution separates religion as a general category. 
To conclude, the goal of this Part of the Article is to show 
that although the political division theory for non-establishment 
can be quite easily dismissed when applied to religion as a 
general category, it is quite persuasive when applied to 
Christian nationality.  Let me turn to the potential ramifications 
this version of the political division theory may hold for 
Establishment Clause doctrine. 
 
V. The Constitutional Implications of Political Division 
 
If one of the principal goals of non-establishment is to 
prevent the political promotion of a religiously defined civic 
identity, then this goal should influence our interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
The political division theory presented in this Article 
strongly supports almost all of the existing, and well-
established, Establishment Clause rules.  The state, for 
instance, is not permitted to engage in any speech that endorses 
or promotes religion.188  This disables government officials and 
institutions from endorsing and promoting Christian nationality 
in their official capacity.  In a concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 
Justice O’Connor makes the connection between formal 
endorsement and political identity explicit, stating that “[t]he 
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s 
standing in the political community.”189  Religion cannot be a 
threshold condition for membership in the political community.  
This also encompasses the rule that the state may not use a 
religious test as a condition for public office.190  One of the major 
political harms of the equation of Christian Identity and 
American Identity is that this will exclude non-Christians (or 
the incorrect kind of Christians) from political power.  This type 
of rule makes certain, at least formally, that this will not occur.  
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Another type of rule that fits well with the political division 
theory is the one that requires that laws have a secular 
legislative purpose.191  This cuts at the root of any attempt to 
promote legislation that is mainly motivated by religious norms. 
The common principle among all of the rules and cases that 
fit well within the political division theory is that they protect 
the public sphere and the state from being captured by religion.  
The general normative thrust of the political division theory is 
that it is deeply concerned about establishment which seeks to 
transform the political and public spheres.  The rules that 
govern the purposes of legislation and the identity of the 
legislators seem to protect against such concerns.  As was 
discussed above, the distinctive attribute of Christian 
nationality is its theological concern with the identity and 
behavior of the nation and the state.  The type of establishment 
that adherents of Christian nationality seek to promote is one 
that is meant to reform the public sphere and the state to 
conform to their religious ideology.  It is not surprising that they 
seek to reverse the chain of cases which removed religion from 
public schools: first, establishing in Engel v. Vitale192 that official 
state-school prayer violates the Establishment Clause; and then 
in Abington Township v. Schempp193 that public school-
sponsored religious activities, including bible readings, was also 
unconstitutional.  It is the encompassing and nature of Christian 
nationality which makes it so different than other religious 
movements. 
What, however, does the political division theory have to say 
about religious establishment that clearly does not seek to 
transform or reform the public and political sphere?  On the 
other end of the spectrum from Christian nationality lie insular, 
reclusive religious groups, such as Chassidic Jews or Old Order 
Amish.  The desire to transform public institutions is completely 
foreign to these groups.  Rather, they seek to protect themselves 
from being transformed by society, and often do not care at all 
for the identity and behavior of the state when it does not 
concern itself with them.  Does state support (in whatever shape) 
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to the education systems of reclusive religious groups raise the 
same set of concerns as the school prayer cases?  If we are 
convinced that the main concern of non-establishment is to 
prevent religious capture of the state, then it would appear that 
supporting these groups seems less hazardous.  In this way, the 
political division theory opens the door for a more lenient 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause when it comes to 
involvement with religion which is not public-facing.  As 
discussed above, non-establishment has (at least) four possible 
interpretations: (1) strict separation; (2) neutrality; (3) non-
coercion; and (4) non-institutionalization.  Strict separation, 
which is about creating a secular public order, seems to meet the 
concerns of the political division theory when it applies to it 
establishment which has the potential for transforming the 
political sphere.  However, potentially, when it applies to 
establishment which merely enables religious communities to 
maintain their identity by isolating themselves from society, 
perhaps a more lenient standard, such as the non-coercion 
interpretation (which allows government intervention with 
religion as long as it does not coerce anyone to accept religion) is 
a better fit. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The prevalence of the political division theory of non-
establishment in the Supreme Court is warranted.  The political 
division theory makes perfect sense when applied to a religion 
which seeks to collapse the distinction between national politics 
and religion.  Christian nationality falls well within this 
category.  The encompassing theological investment of the 
ideology of Christian nationality in the behavior and identity of 
the United States makes it especially divisive.  If this type of 
ideology is adopted and promoted by state organs, this will 
clearly create great alienation and resentment among US 
citizens.  This is a worthy goal for the Establishment Clause. 
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